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ARTICLES 
IMMIGRATION BLAME 
David S. Rubenstein* 
 
This Article provides the first comprehensive study of blame in the U.S. 
immigration system.  Beyond blaming migrants, we blame politicians, 
bureaucrats, and judges.  Meanwhile, these players routinely blame each 
other, all while trying to avoid being blamed.  As modeled here, these 
dynamics of “immigration blame” have catalyzing effects on the politics, 
policies, and structures of immigration law.  Yoking key insights from a range 
of social sciences, this Article offers unique perspectives on the operation 
and design choices of the immigration system.  Moreover, through a blame 
lens, the terms of debate over amnesty, immigration enforcement, the travel 
ban, sanctuary cities, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s plenary power doctrine 
come into sharper focus. 
In turn, this Article’s descriptive portrayal of immigration blame prompts 
some vexing normative questions:  Is immigration blame desirable?  Can its 
inputs and outputs be controlled?  If so, how and toward what ends?  In 
immigration, as elsewhere, blame is a paradox:  both functional and 
dysfunctional, socially cohering and corrosive.  That being so, we should not 
aim for a blame-free immigration system.  Rather, we should seek ways to 
promote the values of immigration blame, while minimizing its more 
unsavory manifestations.  Toward those ends, this Article prescribes an 
“ethics of immigration blame” and suggests ways that law might be 
harnessed to mediate some of blame’s pathologies.  Today’s sociopolitical 
conditions crystallize the need for this work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
No single theory explains what makes our immigration system tick.  But 
one idea—blame—has significant untapped potential.  Common in our daily 
lives, blame registers disapproval of wrongful behavior.1  On a broader scale, 
blame is a tool for maintaining social and legal order.2  Indeed, the 
anticipation of being blamed causes most people, most of the time, to hew 
close to behavioral norms.3  This Article provides the first comprehensive 
study of blame in the U.S. immigration system.  I will argue that, for better 
and worse, blame systemically transfigures the politics, policies, and 
structures of immigration law. 
At ground level, blame pervades public discourse about migrants.  The 
nation’s general antipathy toward “criminal aliens,” for instance, is based on 
perceptions of their blameworthiness.4  Even lawfully present migrants are 
blamed for stealing jobs, harming the environment, not assimilating, and 
more.5  Meanwhile, the “Dreamers” who were unlawfully brought to the 
country as children are frontrunners for amnesty, in large part, because they 
are blameless.6 
 
 1. See Angela M. Smith, Moral Blame and Moral Protest, in BLAME:  ITS NATURE AND 
NORMS 29, 29 (D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini eds., 2013); Lawrence M. Solan, 
Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse to Blame, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1006–11 (2003) 
(offering a psychological explanation for the human impulse to blame); infra notes 42–46 and 
accompanying text. 
 2. See STEPHEN FINEMAN, THE BLAME BUSINESS:  THE USES AND MISUSES OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY 8 (2015) (arguing that, without blame, moral codes and legal structures 
would be unsustainable). 
 3. See Mark Bovens et al., Public Accountability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY 1, 15 (Mark Bovens et al. eds., 2014) (“As people seek approval . . . they 
will adjust their actions and decisions to societal norms and expectations of appropriate 
conduct.”); Christopher Hood, Blame Avoidance and Accountability:  Positive, Negative, or 
Neutral?, in ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE:  PROBLEMS AND PROMISES 167, 170 (Melvin J. 
Dubnick & H. George Frederickson eds., 2011). 
 4. See Angélica Cházaro, Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm, 63 UCLA L. 
REV. 594, 599 (2016) (discussing “narratives that pit worthy (hardworking, family-oriented) 
immigrants against unworthy (criminal alien) immigrants”); Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, 
The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 811–12 (2007) 
(explaining that the United States immigration enforcement model uses criminality as a proxy 
for unbelonging and undesirability); Kevin R. Johnson, Ten Guiding Principles for Truly 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform:  A Blueprint, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1599, 1607 (2009) 
(“[T]he ‘criminal alien’ continues to be one of the most reviled characters of all of U.S. law, 
with many enemies and extremely few political friends (even among immigrant rights 
advocates).”); infra Part I.A. 
 5. See infra Part I.A (discussing a range of perceived social harms attributed to migrants). 
 6. See Matthew La Corte & Melanie Huettman, Congress Needs to Provide Dreamers 
with Permanent Protection, HILL (July 20, 2017, 1:20 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-
blog/civil-rights/342953-congress-needs-to-provide-dreamers-with-permanent-protection 
[https://perma.cc/UX8R-BLEW] (noting that “Dreamers are a blameless population and 
constitute productive members of society”).  The innocence of children was also a key theme 
in Plyler v. Doe, a landmark decision that constitutionally protected undocumented children 
against state and local restrictions on K–12 education. 457 U.S. 202, 223–24 (1982); see also 
MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, NO UNDOCUMENTED CHILD LEFT BEHIND:  PLYLER V. DOE AND THE 
EDUCATION OF UNDOCUMENTED SCHOOLCHILDREN 10–18 (2012) (explaining that the legal 
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Why migrants get blamed, and which ones, are important subjects of 
concern.7  Missing from the literature, however, is a theoretical model of how 
blame dynamics interface with immigration governance writ large.  This 
Article initiates that project, yoking key insights from political science, 
psychology, sociology, anthropology, and philosophy. 
As conceived here, “immigration blame” is a sprawling phenomenon.  
Beyond blaming migrants, we blame politicians, bureaucrats, and judges.  
Meanwhile, these players routinely blame each other, all while trying to 
avoid being blamed.8  The results are messy and the implications vast.  After 
examining the immigration system through the optics of blame, however, it 
may be hard to see it any other way. 
To start, consider two stylized scenarios.  In Scenario One, a legislator’s 
key constituents believe that a category of migrants is blameworthy.  In 
Scenario Two, a legislator’s key constituents believe that a different category 
of migrants is blameless.  In both scenarios, the legislator has a choice to 
make:  take favorable action, unfavorable action, or no action toward the 
migrants at issue.  Intuitively, a legislator’s political risk of upsetting 
constituents is higher for granting favorable treatment to the blameworthy 
migrants (Scenario One) and lower for granting favorable treatment to the 
blameless migrants (Scenario Two). 
For reasons explicated below, matters are far more nuanced and complex 
in practice.  Even in sketch form, however, this introductory salvo has much 
to offer.  First, it captures two discrete streams of blame:  one focused on 
blaming migrants, the other focused on blaming public officials.  Second, 
this opening portrait suggests a relational quality between the blame directed 
at migrants and public officials.  Namely, as the degree of the migrants’ 
blameworthiness increases, so does the public official’s risk of political 
blame for taking favorable action toward the migrants at issue. 
Third, and most important, this thought experiment primes how 
immigration blame can have real-world consequences.  In the stylized 
framing above, one group of migrants was labeled blameworthy (Scenario 
One) and the other blameless (Scenario Two).  In practice, however, those 
judgments are often hotly contested precisely because perceptions of blame 
can shape legal and political outcomes. 
Specifically, if public officials are averse to being blamed, then policy 
victories for blameworthy migrants will be harder to achieve.  Meanwhile, as 
 
team behind Plyler had community support, which attracted resources and enabled them to 
tell the story of the innocent schoolchildren). 
 7. See, e.g., GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 36–38 (Anchor Books abr. 
ed. 1958) (analyzing use of migrants and other minorities as scapegoats by “in-groups”); 
KEVIN JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH:  IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 3–5 (2003) 
(arguing that racial undertones in immigration law are a window for racial undertones in U.S. 
society more generally); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING:  THE LOST STORY OF 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 121–32 (2006) (discussing the history 
of racial restrictions in immigration law). 
 8. See infra Part III (cataloging and illustrating a range of blame-avoidance tactics 
employed by migrants and public officials pertaining to immigration law). 
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public perceptions about a category of migrants improve, officials may be 
more inclined to give favorable legal treatment to the migrants at issue.9  
Indeed, as the putative blame of a category of migrants approaches zero, 
public officials may be blamed for not taking favorable action.  These blame 
dynamics can also manifest in more dubious ways.  For example, public 
officials or pundits might concoct false narratives about migrants, hoping to 
justify or rally troops around restrictionist immigration policies. 
So construed, immigration “blame games” are high-stakes affairs for 
public officials and migrants alike.10  For migrants, their societal membership 
may depend on public perceptions of their relative blameworthiness.  For 
government officials, their reputations, careers, and legacies may be on the 
line. Migrants and public officials thus have coterminous and oft-competing 
incentives to blame others and avoid being blamed. 
As detailed herein, the most common blame-avoiding tactics are 
rhetorical:  narratives, excuses, justifications, blaming others, and framing 
techniques.  These tactics are utilized by all players in the system, including 
migrants, their advocates, public officials, and their spokespersons.11  
Meanwhile, public officials often have additional blame-avoiding tactics 
available.  For example, officials may select immigration policies with an eye 
toward avoiding or minimizing blame from their constituents, principals, or 
peers.  Moreover, officials may renounce their own authority over an issue, 
delegate authority to others, or enter governmental partnership arrangements.  
Then, if things go wrong, blame can be diffused or lodged elsewhere.12 
Welcome to the understudied world of immigration blame.  As modeled 
here, immigration blame operates along two related dimensions, each with 
two prongs.  The first dimension is substantive and captures different 
channels of blame:  the blame directed at migrants (“migrant blame”) and the 
blame directed at public officials (“institutional blame”).  The second 
dimension is process oriented, capturing the sociopolitical dynamics of 
placing blame (“blame attribution”) and avoiding, refuting, and mitigating 
blame (“blame avoidance”).13  These blame dynamics operate in cycling 
 
 9. Whereas migrant blameworthiness may be a reason for taking unfavorable political 
action, migrant blamelessness is generally a weaker prompt for favorable action.  A reason for 
this asymmetry is that the absence of blame is generally neutral, whereas the presence of blame 
indicates a negative departure from behavioral norms. See infra Part IV.C (elaborating on this 
point in the context of current debates over amnesty and immigration enforcement). 
 10. See CHRISTOPHER HOOD, THE BLAME GAME:  SPIN, BUREAUCRACY, AND SELF-
PRESERVATION IN GOVERNMENT 7 (2011) (describing the “blame game” as a process in which 
“multiple players are trying to pin the responsibility on one another for some adverse event, 
acting as blamers to avoid being blamees”). 
 11. See infra Part II.D (describing these rhetorical devices); Part III.A (describing how 
these devices are employed as blame-avoidance tactics). 
 12. See infra Part III.B–C. 
 13. The terms “blame attribution” and “blame avoidance” are borrowed from social 
sciences. See, e.g., KELLY G. SHAVER, THE ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME:  CAUSALITY, 
RESPONSIBILITY, AND BLAMEWORTHINESS 174 (1985); R. Kent Weaver, The Politics of Blame 
Avoidance, 6 J. PUB. POL’Y 371, 380 (1986). 
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feedback, with catalyzing effects on the operation and design choices of the 
immigration system.14 
To anchor and illustrate these points, this Article surveys today’s headline 
immigration disputes—from amnesty to immigration enforcement, from 
sanctuary cities15 to “crimmigration” trends,16 from the Trump 
administration’s travel bans17 to its zero-tolerance border policy,18 from the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s special immigration doctrines19 to lower courts’ 
frontline decisions.  Examining these subjects through a blame lens offers a 
unique perspective, which both complicates and complements more 
conventional accounts. 
Of course, blame cannot explain everything about our immigration system.  
No conceptual model can.  Blame is a particularly useful frame, however, 
because it connects a diverse set of academic theories and disciplines. 
Public-choice theory, for instance, depicts government officials and 
institutions as support-maximizing actors.20  Avoiding blame from peers, 
principals, and constituents—through delegation or otherwise—is a key 
ingredient of that strategic modeling.21  Behavioral-economic theories 
 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. The term “sanctuary” generally connotes a local jurisdiction’s policies that restrain 
local law enforcement from initiating or voluntarily cooperating with federal immigration 
enforcement efforts.  For recent and incisive work on the “sanctuary movement,” see generally 
Jason A. Cade, Sanctuaries as Equitable Delegation in an Era of Mass Immigration 
Enforcement, 113 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigrant Protective 
Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 245 (2016); Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose 
Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Networks, 103 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019); Christopher N. 
Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 58 B.C. L. REV. 1703 (2018). 
 16. Professor Juliet Stumpf coined the term “crimmigration” in her seminal article on the 
subject. See generally Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis:  Immigrants, Crime, and 
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006).  There are many dimensions of 
crimmigration, but it generally refers to the intersections and conflation of criminal law and 
civil immigration law.  For an extended treatment, see generally CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA 
HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW (2015).  For some more specific applications, see also 
Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135 
(2009) and Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281 (2010). 
 17. As of this writing, the travel ban is in its third iteration. See Proclamation No. 9645, 
82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017); see also Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965, slip op. at 12–
13 (U.S. June 26, 2018); infra notes 90–105, 402–07 and accompanying text (discussing the 
travel bans and related litigation). 
 18. See Memorandum from Jefferson Sessions, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Federal 
Prosecutors Along the Southwest Border (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/1049751/download [https://perma.cc/9DNM-G9F2] [hereinafter Zero-Tolerance 
Memo]; see also infra notes 370–82 and accompanying text (discussing the “zero-tolerance” 
policy and the still-unfolding crisis of family separations causally linked to the policy). 
 19. See generally David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration 
Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583 (2017) (charting the literature and doctrines of 
“immigration exceptionalism”). 
 20. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE:  A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION 1 (1991). 
 21. See Public Choice, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1987) 
(explaining that public-choice theory models government as made up of officials who, besides 
pursuing the public interest, might act to benefit themselves, possibly at the cost of efficiency 
or majoritarian preferences).  Through a public-choice lens, one way that blame is avoided is 
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explain how cognitive heuristics and biases can lead to irrational judgments, 
including blaming attitudes that can distort immigration-related decisions.22  
Critical-legal theory posits how race and other social constructs trigger 
blaming attitudes toward certain groups of migrants.23  Research in cognitive 
and social psychology explains how our emotions, such as anger and 
sympathy, affect judgments of blame.24  Building on those ideas, the 
burgeoning law-and-emotions literature explains how our emotion-laden 
perceptions may be expressed (or mediated) through law and government 
institutions.25  Cultural theory, and its extensions, model how variations in 
cultural “worldviews” can influence perceptions of harm and responsibility, 
and thus whom and what to blame.26  Studies in moral philosophy offer 
probing reflections on what blame is and ought to be.27  Of equal importance 
are our own life experiences, which teach us much about blame.  This 
Article’s interdisciplinary approach connects and draws inspiration from 
these scattered insights in ways that none alone captures. 
Beyond its descriptive appeal, the study of immigration blame prompts 
some vexing normative questions.  Foremost, is immigration blame 
desirable?  Can its dynamic levers be harnessed and controlled?  If so, how 
and toward what ends?  This Article grapples with these and related 
questions.  Despite its ubiquity (or perhaps because of it), blame is generally 
derided in the immigration literature.  Scholars have been understandably 
 
through delegating decisions. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 
68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 56–57 (1982); see also infra Part III.B. 
 22. See infra Part II (extending key insights from behavioral economics to the immigration 
context). 
 23. See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Post-Racial Proxy Battles over Immigration, in STRANGE 
NEIGHBORS:  THE ROLE OF STATES IN IMMIGRATION POLICY 229 (Carissa Byrne Hessick & 
Gabriel J. Chin eds., 2014); Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. 
Immigration Law and Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 15–22 (2009) (explaining 
racial dimensions of immigration law); see also infra notes 156–60 and accompanying text. 
 24. See, e.g., Neal Feigenson, Emotional Influences on Judgments of Legal Blame:  How 
They Happen, Whether They Should, and What to Do About It, in EMOTION AND THE LAW:  
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 45 (Brian H. Bornstein & Richard L. Wiener eds., 2010); 
see also infra Part II (discussing the dynamic relationships between heuristics and biases, 
emotions, and blame). 
 25. For an excellent overview of the descriptive and normative dimensions of law-and-
emotions scholarship, see generally THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) 
(offering an early landmark collection of law-and-emotions scholarship); Kathryn Abrams & 
Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1997 (2010); Terry A. 
Maroney, Law and Emotion:  A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 119 (2006). 
 26. According to cultural theory, people hold different preferences about how society 
should be organized. See generally MICHAEL THOMPSON ET AL., CULTURAL THEORY (1990).  
In turn, these “worldviews” can significantly shape judgments about whom to blame, for what, 
and why. See MARY DOUGLAS, Risk and Blame, in RISK AND BLAME:  ESSAYS IN CULTURAL 
THEORY 3, 8, 15–16 (2003).  The related “cultural cognition” model connects cultural theory 
to cognitive and social psychology.  For an overview of these related theories, see generally 
Dan M. Kahan, Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory of Risk, in 
HANDBOOK OF RISK THEORY (S. Roeser et al. eds., 2012).  See also infra Part II.C (discussing 
and extending these theories to immigration blame). 
 27. See generally BLAME:  ITS NATURE AND NORMS, supra note 1 (collecting philosophical 
essays on the nature and norms of blame). 
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preoccupied with blame directed at migrants, which can be nefarious, 
misdirected, and disproportionate.28  More generally, the emotive force 
behind blame can skew rational judgment and impede social progress.29  This 
Article gives voice to these very serious concerns.30  As importantly, 
however, this Article offers a partial rehabilitation—immigration blame has 
upsides too.31 
Broadly speaking, the problems are with unjustified blame, not with blame 
per se.  When attributed fairly, blame can be a rational sorting device in the 
social, legal, and political contexts at issue.32  Choices about which 
noncitizens to include, exclude, and remove from the country are the 
foundations of any immigration system, which justified blame can rightly 
inform.  Likewise, choices about which public officials to include, exclude, 
and remove from office are the foundations of representative democracy.  
When justified, blame can sanction poor government performance and 
motivate better outcomes.  Moreover, in some contexts, the iterative 
dynamics of placing and avoiding blame can promote government 
transparency and sharpen lines of accountability.  In addition, higher-ups 
hoping to avoid blame may delegate authority to public officials who are 
better equipped to make the decisions.  In these and other ways, blame 
dynamics may result in good governance—directly and indirectly, wittingly 
and unwittingly.33 
To be clear, none of this denies the hazards of immigration blame.  But to 
make theoretical headway, it is crucial to appreciate that blame is a paradox:  
both functional and dysfunctional, socially cohering and corrosive.  That 
being so, we should not aspire to a blame-free immigration system.  Rather, 
we should seek ways to promote the values of immigration blame, while 
minimizing its more unsavory manifestations.  Toward those ends, this 
Article prescribes an “ethics of immigration blame” and suggests ways that 
law might be harnessed to mediate some of blame’s pathologies.34 
At a minimum, we must learn to live with immigration blame.  In a very 
real sense, immigration debates are sites of contestation about who we are 
and wish to be as a nation.35  Especially in a hyperpolarized and “post-truth” 
 
 28. See infra Part I.A (discussing what migrants get blamed for and why they get blamed); 
see also supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text. 
 29. See Derk Pereboom, Free Will Skepticism, Blame, and Obligation, in BLAME:  ITS 
NATURE AND NORMS, supra note 1, at 189, 204 (“[B]lame fueled by moral anger arguably 
renders it particularly susceptible to errors that threaten to undermine the integrity and 
effectiveness of the moral conversation.”); infra Part II (explaining how perceptions can be 
systemically wrong and lead to irrational decisions). 
 30. See infra Part V.C (arguing for an “ethics of immigration blame,” in part to counter 
misattributed and pernicious blame). 
 31. See infra Part V.A (discussing the instrumental values of blame). 
 32. See infra Part V.A. 
 33. See infra Parts IV–V (providing a descriptive and normative account of these 
dynamics). 
 34. See infra Part V.C–D (offering a framework and prescriptions for doing so). 
 35. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 7; DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION:  
OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2007) (providing a rich historical account of communal 
self-idealization and self-protection through American deportation policies). 
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world, the dynamics of immigration blame will increasingly matter to the 
complexion of our political and social communities.36  This cultural context 
lends some urgency to the project ahead.  Yet there is a more enduring point, 
which is also more fundamental:  we have never had a blame-free society.  
For better and worse, blame is hardwired to the human condition.37  And, for 
better and worse, blame is hardwired to the immigration system too. 
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I provides an overview of what 
migrants and public officials get blamed for.  Part II explains the cognitive 
and social processes of blame attribution and misattribution.  Part III pivots 
to blame avoidance.  It describes a range of tactics utilized by migrants and 
public officials to refuse, diffuse, and deflect blame.  Part IV connects these 
dynamics, modeling the inputs and outputs of immigration blame, with case 
studies drawn from current events.  Part V turns to the normative and 
prescriptive dimensions of immigration blame.  It begins with a discussion 
of the values and trade-offs of immigration blame.  It then scaffolds an ethics 
of immigration blame, and suggests how legalistic nudges may help to curb 
some of blame’s deleterious effects. 
Before proceeding, I should note that many of the ideas and themes 
developed here can be extended to other regulatory contexts, wherever blame 
is found.  Readers are encouraged to make those connections.  For several 
reasons, however, this Article fastens on the U.S. immigration system.  
Ingroup-outgroup dynamics are breeding grounds for blame, both in 
immigration and beyond.38  But immigration, by its very nature, is keyed to 
who is “in” and “out”—socially, legally, politically, and physically.39  
Immigration thus offers an especially intriguing platform for studying the 
intersection of blame and public law. 
Moreover, immigration is a subject where passions run high.  Especially 
in recent years, the saliency of immigration has mobilized voters and 
contributed to key electoral outcomes.  The historic presidential election of 
 
 36. See Post-Truth, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
post-truth [https://perma.cc/3U59-MY97] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018) (defining post-truth as 
“[r]elating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping 
public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief”); see also SHAVER, supra note 13, 
at 174 (“One person’s judgments of causality, responsibility, and blameworthiness may or may 
not agree with the judgments that would have been made by a different perceiver.”). 
 37. See, e.g., TOM DOUGLAS, SCAPEGOATS:  TRANSFERRING BLAME 60, 107–08 (1995) 
(describing blame attribution and blame avoidance as “basic human” needs). 
 38. See id. at 135–48; cf. Eric A. Posner, The Institutional Structure of Immigration Law, 
80 U. CHI. L. REV. 289, 291 (2013) (asserting that U.S. immigration law is concerned with the 
“maximization of the well-being of Americans” without consideration for the interests of 
noncitizens). 
 39. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Rubén G. Rumbaut, Terms of Belonging:  Are 
Models of Membership Self-Fulfilling Prophecies?, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 2–3 (1998); Kevin 
R. Johnson, Los Olvidados:  Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and 
Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1139, 1163 (“Immigrants, often 
viewed as outsiders to the community, periodically have been one of the groups singled out 
for blame in the political process.”); see also note 7 and accompanying text. 
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Donald Trump is a case in point.40  Now, leading up to the 2018 midterm 
elections, a recent poll found that immigration tops the list of important issues 
among voters.41  If immigration blame is affecting the composition of our 
government representatives and institutions, then, by extension, the stakes of 
immigration blame spill across regulatory lines—and indeed, beyond 
American borders. 
I.  BLAME ATTRIBUTION 
Studies in social science generally describe blame attribution as hinging 
on two perceptions:  (1) avoidable harm and (2) responsibility.42  Thus, we 
generally blame those whom we think are responsible for causing harm that 
could have been avoided if the person being blamed had acted differently.43  
Beyond mere judgment, blame is an emotionally charged reaction.44  Unlike 
other negative reactions, such as sadness and disappointment, blame is 
usually linked to anger, indignation, or resentment.45  Blame thus carries a 
certain sting, or normative force, that distinguishes it from other kinds of 
negative judgment.46 
 
 40. In his bid for the presidency, Trump first shouldered his way through a crowded pack 
of Republican primary contenders by blaming Mexican migrants and pledging to build a wall 
along the U.S.-Mexico border. See Full Text:  Donald Trump Announces a Presidential Bid, 
WASH. POST (June 16, 2015) [hereinafter Trump Announces Presidential Bid], 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-donald-trump-
announces-a-presidential-bid/ [https://perma.cc/XND4-MGVD] (transcribing Trump’s 
statement, “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. . . .  They’re 
bringing drugs.  They’re bringing crime.  They’re rapists.  And some, I assume, are good 
people.”); cf. Seth McLaughlin, Donald Trump’s Comments Spark Poll Surge, Put 2016 
Republican Hopefuls on the Spot, WASH. TIMES (July 2, 2015), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/2/donald-trump-comments-spark-poll-
surge-put-2016-re/ [https://perma.cc/NJ8F-7UBN] (noting rising poll numbers).  Encouraged 
by his rise in the primary polls, Trump later proclaimed that the United States should ban 
Muslim immigrants from entering the country. See Russell Berman, Donald Trump’s Call to 
Ban Muslim Immigrants, ATLANTIC (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2015/12/donald-trumps-call-to-ban-muslim-immigrants/419298/ [https://perma.cc/ 
B3BN-WBJ9].  That generated a second spike in Trump’s primary ratings. Pema Levy, Trump 
Soars to New Heights in Poll After Proposing Muslim Ban, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 14, 2015), 
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2015/12/donald-trump-proposes-ban-muslims-soars-
new-heights-poll [https://perma.cc/RWY3-DMET]. 
 41. See Maria Caspani, Immigration Top Issue for US Voters, Economy a Close Second:  
Reuters/Ipsos Poll, AOL (July 8, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.aol.com/article/news/ 
2018/07/08/immigration-top-issue-for-us-voters-economy-a-close-second-reutersipsos-
poll/23476262/ [https://perma.cc/AV5Q-794T]. 
 42. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 6–7; SHAVER, supra note 13, at vii (noting that blame is 
“the outcome of a process that begins with an event having negative consequences, involves 
judgments about causality, personal responsibility, and possible mitigation”). 
 43. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 6–7. 
 44. See Smith, supra note 1, at 31 (describing blame as “a way of responding 
emotionally”).  For a discussion of how emotions can influence whether to blame, and whom 
(or what) to blame, see infra Part II.B. 
 45. See Michael McKenna, Directed Blame and Conversation, in BLAME:  ITS NATURE 
AND NORMS, supra note 1, at 119, 122. 
 46. See Martha C. Nussbaum, “Secret Sewers of Vice”:  Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in 
THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 25, at 19, 26–29 (explaining how anger and indignation can 
function as an expression of collective moral judgment); Smith, supra note 1, at 29 (explaining 
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This Part describes two types of blame that feed the broader phenomenon 
of immigration blame.  The first is “migrant blame,” which is the assignment 
of blame to migrants.47  The second is “institutional blame,” which is the 
assignment of blame to public officials.48  To be clear, these types of blame 
are not hermeneutically sealed or mutually exclusive.  Quite the contrary, one 
of this Article’s main contributions is to theorize how migrant blame and 
institutional blame dynamically relate.49  Before turning to those 
complexities, however, it will be useful to elaborate on them separately.50 
A.  Migrant Blame 
Migrants get blamed for a range of perceived harms and wrongs, which 
fluctuate and evolve over time depending on economic, social, and political 
conditions.51  While a legal violation is often deemed sufficient for migrant 
blame to attach, it is not a necessary condition.  Rightly or wrongly, even 
lawfully present migrants get blamed for societal ills.  Today, the most 
common tropes of migrant-related harm pertain to crime,52 the economy,53 
 
that blame has a certain “‘force’ or ‘depth’ that goes beyond a mere description of causal 
responsibility for a bad result”).  But cf. GEORGE SHER, IN PRAISE OF BLAME 88–89 (2006) 
(arguing that while indignation and resentment are commonly associated with blame, they are 
not essential or necessary, and thus people can blame in more emotionally detached ways). 
 47. See infra Part I.A. 
 48. See infra Part I.B. 
 49. See infra Part IV. 
 50. While my model is primarily concerned with the blaming of people and institutions, 
the targets of blame are often events and situations.  For example, we might blame social and 
economic disparities, or political dysfunction, or global conditions for perceived harms in our 
immigration system.  And, indeed, the blaming of events and situations can be highly relevant 
to immigration blame.  But in most instances, such blame attribution comes in lieu of the 
blame that might otherwise be directed at individuals and groups and is captured by my model 
to that extent.  For further discussion, see infra notes 181–82 and accompanying text. 
 51. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 31–55 (2014) (drawing 
similar connections); see also Johnson, supra note 39, at 1156 (“[T]he average citizen’s only 
exposure to the subject of immigration may be hearing immigrants blamed in times of societal 
stress for the social ills of the day.”). 
 52. Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose Community Shield?:  Examining the Removal of the 
“Criminal Street Gang Member,” 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 318–19 (examining the “flawed 
but lurid contemporary accounts of the criminality of the immigrant population and the general 
presumption of group dangerousness”); Cházaro, supra note 4, at 606–08. 
 53. In his interview with Kate Snow, former congressman Tom DeLay argued that 
immigrants have a “monumental” economic impact:  “most of these illegals are drawing 
welfare benefits, they’re sending their kids to school, they’re using public services.” Border 
States at Forefront of Immigration Debate, MSNBC (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.msnbc.com/ 
kate-snow/watch/border-states-at-forefront-of-immigration-debate-756174915913 
[https://perma.cc/76AC-QHM3].  The economic impact of undocumented immigration, in 
particular, is complicated by how economic boons and losses are disparately felt at the federal, 
state, and local levels. See PETER SCHUCK & JAMES Q. WILSON, UNDERSTANDING AMERICA:  
THE ANATOMY OF AN EXCEPTIONAL NATION 350 (2008). 
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terrorism,54 and cultural threats (for not assimilating, or for just being 
different).55 
Fear and loathing of migrant outsiders trace to the early Republic, with 
Chinese and other Asian migrants among the first blamed for contaminating 
American society.56  Ever since, the cultural-threat narrative has weaved 
through American history mostly unabated; what changes is the primary 
targets of this opprobrium.57  In the early twentieth century, for example, it 
was migrant Jews, eastern Europeans, and socialists whom were most 
disparaged.58  From the Great Depression, and continuing today, Latinos 
have borne the brunt of migrant blame.59  Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
Muslims and Arabs have been branded as threats to American values and 
national security.60 
 
 54. Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After 
September 11, 2001:  The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
295, 326 (2002). 
 55. For an extended account of how migrants have been blamed on cultural and racial 
grounds, throughout history, see generally JOHNSON, supra note 7.  See also infra notes 56–60 
and accompanying text. 
 56. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 
581, 595 (1889) (upholding a federal ban on the admission of Chinese migrants and remarking 
that Chinese migrants “remained strangers in the [United States]” and that a “portion of our 
country would be overrun by them unless prompt action was taken to restrict their 
immigration”); see also MOTOMURA, supra note 51, at 35–37 (discussing anti-Asian 
sociopolitical fervor at the turn of the nineteenth century). 
 57. See Leo R. Chavez, “Illegality” Across Generations:  Public Discourse and the 
Children of Undocumented Immigrants, in CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANT “ILLEGALITY”:  
CRITIQUES, EXPERIENCES, AND RESPONSES 84, 86 (Cecilia Menjívar & Daniel Kanstroom eds., 
2014); see also MOTOMURA, supra note 51, at 31–41 (summarizing some of the trends). 
 58. In 1924, Congress passed the National Origins Act. National Origins (Johnson-Reed) 
Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11(a), 43 Stat. 153, 159, repealed by Immigration & Nationality Act 
of 1952, ch. 477, § 201(a), 66 Stat. 163, 175 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1151).  The 
National Origins Act adopted a quota system that drastically capped the number of people 
who could immigrate to this country from southern and eastern Europe, including Russia. Id.; 
see also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1954) (upholding deportation on the basis of 
Communist Party membership); Deborah Sweet Eyler, The Early Female Jewish Members of 
the Maryland Bar:  1920–29, 74 MD. L. REV. 545, 546 n.5 (2015) (noting that Congress’s 
1924 quota system had the effect of limiting, and was likely intended to limit, the number of 
immigrant Jews in America). 
 59. See Loebardo F. Estrada et al., Chicanos in the United States:  A History of 
Exploitation and Resistance, in LATINOS AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 28, 45–52 (F. Chris 
Garcia ed., 1988) (describing how Latinos were blamed and scapegoated during the Great 
Depression and “Operation Wetback” in the mid-twentieth century); see also MOTOMURA, 
supra note 51, at 37–52 (mapping how the opprobrium directed at Latino migrants has ebbed 
and flowed throughout U.S. history, depending on economic and social conditions).  For a 
notorious example of overt anti-Latino sentiment in more recent times, see Samuel P. 
Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 28, 2009, 8:39 PM), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/28/the-hispanic-challenge/ [https://perma.cc/SND2-
42RH], which argues that that the failure of Latino migrants to assimilate into American 
culture will lead to America’s “eventual transformation into two peoples with two cultures 
(Anglo and Hispanic) and two languages (English and Spanish).” 
 60. See ROBERT P. JONES ET AL., PUB. RELIGION RESEARCH INST., ANXIETY, NOSTALGIA, 
AND MISTRUST:  FINDINGS FROM THE 2015 AMERICAN VALUES SURVEY 4 (2017), 
https://www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/PRRI-AVS-2015-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
4Q9C-APZN] (“Today, a majority (56%) of Americans agree that the values of Islam are at 
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Moreover, it is important to emphasize that blame is not evenly spread 
across migrant subpopulations.61  Generally speaking, undocumented 
migrants attract more blame than lawfully present ones;62 migrants who 
commit crimes tend to attract more blame than law-abiding migrants;63 and 
migrants of color tend to attract more blame than their Caucasian 
counterparts.64  As will later be explained, these and other blame 
stratifications can have dramatic effects on immigration politics and policies. 
B.  Institutional Blame 
Meanwhile, public officials are blamed for innumerable harms relating to 
our immigration system.  Itemizing all such harms is unnecessary, and 
mercifully beyond this Article’s scope.  For present purposes, some 
generalizations will suffice, which I will elaborate on more fully throughout. 
First, public officials may be blamed for their action or inaction.  
Regarding inaction, for example, the federal government’s failure to pass 
comprehensive immigration reform over the past decade (and counting) is 
arguably a blameworthy harm.65  Second, public officials may be blamed for 
how they blame others.  For example, immigrant advocates commonly blame 
public officials for concocting false and pernicious narratives about 
migrants.66  Third, public officials may be blamed for case-specific decisions 
 
odds with American values and way of life . . . .”); Akram & Johnson, supra note 54, at 295–
98. 
 61. See, e.g., Angélica Cházaro, Beyond Respectability:  Dismantling the Harms of 
“Illegality,” 52 HARV. J. LEGIS. 355, 356–61 (2015) (explaining how the harm and treatment 
of undocumented migrants are “disproportionately distributed along lines of race and class”). 
 62. The act of entering or being in the country unlawfully is, itself, sometimes an 
independently sufficient reason to blame undocumented migrants.  Whether and to what extent 
unlawful entry is a blameworthy harm are issues at the heart of today’s amnesty debates. See 
infra Parts III.A.1, IV.C.1. 
 63. See Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its 
Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105, 109 (2012). 
 64. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Alien Language:  Immigration Metaphors and the 
Jurisprudence of Otherness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1545, 1577 (2011) (“In contemporary legal 
discourse, references to ‘illegal aliens’ facilitate a coded discussion on immigration that . . . 
focuses on Mexicans in particular.”); see also JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 161–62 (“The 
persistent surfacing of racist statements in the immigration debate, however, clearly 
demonstrates that, at some level, racial concerns influence restrictionist sentiments.”). 
 65. Efforts at comprehensive immigration reform have been percolating in Congress since 
at least 2006 and have faltered each time. See, e.g., RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42980, BRIEF HISTORY OF COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM EFFORTS IN THE 
109TH AND 110TH CONGRESSES TO INFORM POLICY DISCUSSIONS IN THE 113TH CONGRESS 
(2013); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Nicholas Fandos, As Gridlock Deepens in Congress, Only 
Gloom Is Bipartisan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/27/ 
us/politics/congress-dysfunction-conspiracies-trump.html [https://perma.cc/W45X-FRGF]. 
 66. S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance of the 
Political in Immigration Federalism, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1431, 1448–63 (2012) (discussing how 
migrant blame narratives are manufactured by politicians and pundits).  Recently, a group of 
immigration scholars published a critical study of President Trump’s anti-immigrant narrative 
and called it “a complete fiction.” Our Findings, PRESIDENT’S INTENT, 
https://www.thepresidentsintent.com/our-findings [https://perma.cc/TZ4V-ZEML] (last 
visited Aug. 24, 2018) (“Trump’s story about immigrants boils down to just one narrative.  It 
is a complete fiction, a dystopic view of a nation under siege.”). 
138 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
at the microlevel or for policies and regulations at the macrolevel.  This 
Article is primarily focused on the latter.  But some of the most stirring blame 
episodes begin with government decisions at the microlevel, which then 
explode into national frenzies. 
Take, for example, the brouhaha over sanctuary cities.  Although the 
sanctuary movement remains ill-defined, it generally connotes a set of state 
and local policies that limit or prevent cooperation with federal immigration 
enforcement.67  The sanctuary movement is decades old, but it was recently 
thrust into the national spotlight after local jailors in San Francisco released 
an undocumented migrant from custody without first alerting federal 
immigration authorities.68  The released migrant subsequently shot and killed 
an innocent woman (by accident, it turned out).69  Within days, all sanctuary 
cities were accused of endangering the welfare and security of the nation.70 
Then-candidate Donald Trump seized the moment:  he blamed the Obama 
administration for lax immigration enforcement, states and cities for 
interfering with immigration controls, and Mexico for sending us the worst 
of their worst.71  Later, in one of his first acts as president, Trump issued an 
executive order proclaiming that sanctuary jurisdictions would be ineligible 
to receive federal funding.72  Thus, what began as a local decision to release 
an undocumented migrant from jail was catapulted onto the national agenda.  
The results of these institutional blame episodes are still playing out in 
federal court,73 the court of public opinion,74 and legislatures across the 
country.75 
 
 67. See generally Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 15 (canvassing the range of 
sanctuary policies across the country); Lasch et al., supra note 15 (same). 
 68. Brian Bennett, Republicans Blame San Francisco Pier Killing on Obama’s ‘Reckless’ 
Immigration Policies, L.A. TIMES (July 14, 2015, 2:46 PM), http://www.latimes.com/ 
nation/la-na-deport-shooting-20150714-story.html [https://perma.cc/9URL-AE4K]. 
 69. See Zusha Elinson & Alicia A. Caldwell, Illegal Immigrant Found Not Guilty in San 
Francisco Killing, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2017, 10:58 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
illegal-immigrant-found-not-guilty-in-san-francisco-killing-1512091618 [https://perma.cc/ 
ML5Y-QDZS]. 
 70. See Bennett, supra note 68. 
 71. See, e.g., Doug Stanglin, Trump:  San Francisco Shooting Case for Securing the 
Border, USA TODAY (July 4, 2015, 3:39 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story 
/news/nation/2015/07/04/donald-trump-san-francisco-killing-whipping-post/29694403/ 
[https://perma.cc/BYG2-ZV3D]; see also Trump Announces Presidential Bid, supra note 40. 
 72. See Exec. Order No. 13,768 § 9(a), 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 73. See generally, e.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 
2018); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 74. Despite a jury verdict that the shooting was accidental, see supra note 69 and 
accompanying text, blame continues to flow unabated.  Reacting to the jury’s verdict, 
President Trump tweeted:  “The Kate Steinle killer came back and back over the weakly 
protected Obama border, always committing crimes and being violent, and yet this info was 
not used in court.  His exoneration is a complete travesty of justice.  BUILD THE WALL!” 
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 1, 2017, 3:03 AM), https://twitter.com 
/realDonaldTrump/status/936551346299338752 [https://perma.cc/6WQK-2EBY]. 
 75. See, e.g., Kate’s Law, H.R. 3004, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017) (proposing an amendment 
to section 276 of the Immigration and Nationality Act to increase penalties for reentry of 
removed aliens); COOK COUNTY, ILL. § 46-37 (2018) (allowing detainer compliance where 
target of detainer is convicted of a serious or violent felony offense for which he or she is 
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The foregoing example, concerning sanctuary cities, also illustrates how 
laws and legal structures factor into attributions of institutional blame.76  
Recall here that blame generally turns on attributions of (1) avoidable harm 
and (2) responsibility.  The law can inform each of these subsidiary 
judgments.  For example, President Obama’s and President Trump’s 
respective immigration policies have been heavily critiqued on legal 
grounds.77  Those legal violations, or their effects, may be perceived as 
avoidable harm.  In general, there is no preset amount of institutional blame 
that attaches when public officials violate the law.  It depends on the 
circumstances, including which public official violated which law, in what 
way, and to what effect. 
Moreover, the law can be highly relevant to institutional responsibility.  
That is because laws and legal structures can rule in, or rule out, which public 
officials are responsible for which perceived harms.  Pinning down lines of 
responsibility can be challenging in many areas of law.  Immigration law is 
somewhat unique in this regard, however, because the Supreme Court’s 
normal constitutional doctrines do not always apply.78  Some familiarity with 
the Court’s exceptional immigration doctrines will thus be useful here and 
important to later parts of the discussion.79 
To start, the Constitution does not explicitly vest a federal immigration 
power.80  Indeed, for the first century of the Republic, immigration was 
regulated primarily by the states and not by the federal government.81  In the 
mid-1800s, however, the Supreme Court effectively flipped the script.  In a 
series of federalism cases, the Court interpreted the Constitution to vest the 
nation’s immigration power exclusively in the federal government.82  Still 
 
currently in custody); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 9-131 (2018) (including 
numerous crime-based exceptions to noncompliance with detainers); see also CAL. GOV’T 
CODE §§ 7282.5(a), 7284.6(a)(4) (West 2018) (same); infra Part IV.C.4 (discussing state and 
local sanctuary laws). 
 76. See infra Part IV.B–C (elaborating on how law is both an input and output of 
institutional blame). 
 77. See generally Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965 (U.S. June 26, 2018); United States v. 
Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam) (affirming, without opinion, the Fifth Circuit’s 
preliminary injunction of DAPA in Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 657 (5th Cir. 2015)). 
 78. See Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 19, at 584 (“Immigration law is famously 
exceptional.”). 
 79. See infra Parts III.C, IV.C.3, V.D. 
 80. The Constitution expressly vests Congress with the power to establish uniform 
naturalization laws. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  Whereas naturalization involves questions of 
citizenship, immigration law mostly concerns the admission, expulsion, and treatment of 
noncitizens in the country and is arguably a much more expansive power.  That is not to say 
that Congress does not have immigration power; only that the Constitution does not expressly 
grant that power to Congress. 
 81. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1841–80 (1993). 
 82. See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280–81 (1875) (striking down a state 
regulation that imposed a bond for arriving alien passengers deemed to be “lewd and 
debauched”); Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 273–75 (1875) (striking down a 
requirement that a bond be posted by shipmasters for arriving alien passengers); see also 
Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 19, at 600, 603–06 (discussing the origins and import 
140 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
today, states are generally prohibited under the “exclusivity doctrine” from 
directly regulating the admission and expulsion of migrants to and from the 
United States.83 
While the exclusivity doctrine restricts state immigration laws, it says 
nothing about the scope or division of immigration power among the three 
federal branches.  In the late 1800s, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal 
political branches had plenary (i.e., complete) authority to regulate the 
admission and expulsion of migrants.84  Under this so-called plenary power 
doctrine, the Court deemed itself powerless to review Congress’s or the 
Executive’s immigration decisions for alleged constitutional violations.85 
To a surprising extent, the plenary power doctrine is still good law today.86  
Indeed, that is what makes it special:  instead of receiving heightened judicial 
scrutiny, constitutional challenges to federal immigration policies remain 
“largely immune” from judicial review.87  Thus, federal immigration laws 
that allegedly violate equal protection, substantive due process, and First 
Amendment rights, garner very little scrutiny from the Court.88  More 
generally, the plenary power doctrine results in a regulatory regime that, in 
the Court’s own words, “would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”89 
For those wondering how President Trump’s travel ban survived Supreme 
Court review,90 the plenary power doctrine is at least partly the reason why.91  
As of this writing, the travel ban is in its third iteration, in the form of 
 
of the exclusivity doctrine); id. at 618–20 (canvassing and contrasting a number of academic 
treatments of the exclusivity doctrine). 
 83. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363–65 (1976) (delineating the contours of the 
modern exclusivity doctrine).  There are some exceptions to the exclusivity doctrine’s general 
prohibition. See infra notes 110–17 and accompanying text (discussing the delegated and 
residual authority states have to pass laws pertaining to noncitizens). 
 84. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604 
(1889) (upholding the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 on the ground that the federal 
government had complete authority to exclude immigrants on any basis, including race or 
nationality); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705–08, 713 (1893) 
(extending this reasoning to the federal political branches’ deportation laws). 
 85. See, e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604–09; see also Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. 
CT. REV. 255, 255 (coining the term “plenary power doctrine”); Hiroshi Motomura, 
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:  Phantom Constitutional Norms and 
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 (1990). 
 86. See Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 19, at 594–99 (discussing the contours of 
the modern plenary power doctrine, including recent cracks in its facade). 
 87. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (“Our cases ‘have long recognized 
the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the 
Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.’” (quoting 
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953))). 
 88. See, e.g., id.; United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) 
(reifying Congress’s virtually impenetrable discretion, stating:  “[w]hatever the procedure 
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned”). 
 89. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976). 
 90. See generally Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965 (U.S. June 26, 2018). 
 91. See David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Symposium:  The Future of Immigration 
Exceptionalism, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/ 
immigration-symposium-future-immigration-exceptionalism/ [https://perma.cc/CT6Z-
6ESV]; see also infra notes 92–94, 405–07 and accompanying text. 
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Proclamation No. 9645 (“the Proclamation”).92  Relying on a broadly worded 
delegation of power from Congress to the president,93 and citing national-
security concerns, the Proclamation restricts entry of nationals from certain 
countries, most of which have Muslim-majority populations.94 
The Proclamation was challenged on a number of legal grounds, including 
alleged violation of the Establishment Clause.95  Generally speaking, the 
Establishment Clause forbids the government from disfavoring or favoring 
one religion over another.96  In Trump v. Hawaii,97 the crux of the plaintiffs’ 
claim was that the Proclamation was motivated by animus toward Muslims.98  
In support, plaintiffs cited many examples of public statements made by 
Donald Trump, both while campaigning for the presidency and after taking 
office.99  In much of the rhetoric at issue, Trump blamed Muslims for 
endangering the safety and welfare of the American people.100 
The plaintiffs might have prevailed under the Court’s “reasonable 
observer” standard, which is the test normally employed by the Court in 
Establishment Clause cases.101  Tellingly, however, the Court declined to 
apply that standard.  The Court began by explaining that “[t]he case before 
us differs in numerous respects from the conventional Establishment Clause 
claim.”102  Reifying the plenary power doctrine, the Court stressed:  “For 
more than a century, this Court has recognized that the admission and 
exclusion of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised 
by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial 
control.’”103  At most, the Court explained, “rational-basis” review 
applied.104  And, under that highly deferential standard, the plaintiffs’ 
Establishment Clause claim fell short.105 
Considered separately, or together, the Court’s plenary power and 
exclusivity doctrines can inform which public officials to blame for 
immigration-related harms.  For instance, if the federal government has a 
monopoly over immigration regulation (per the exclusivity doctrine), the 
 
 92. See Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
 93. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012) (granting the president authority to restrict the entry of 
aliens whenever he finds that their entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the United 
States”); Trump, slip op. at 16 (remarking that the statutory text “exudes” deference to the 
president, and holding that the Proclamation fell within statutory bounds). 
 94. See Trump, slip op. at 12–13 (discussing the Proclamation and its prior iterations); 
Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. at 45,165–67. 
 95. See Trump, slip op. at 12; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 96. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (“[T]he 
First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion . . . .”); 
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). 
 97. No. 17-965 (U.S. June 26, 2018). 
 98. Id. at 15. 
 99. Id. at 37–39 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 100. See id. 
 101. Cf. id. at 36 (citing McCreary County. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862, 866 
(2005)). 
 102. Id. at 24 (majority opinion). 
 103. Id. (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)). 
 104. Id. at 25. 
 105. Id. at 25–28. 
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polity might be less apt to hold state officials responsible for perceived 
immigration-related harms.  Meanwhile, if immigration power is lodged 
almost exclusively in the federal political branches (per the plenary power 
doctrine), then the polity might be less apt to blame courts for federal 
immigration failures.  In these ways, the plenary power and exclusivity 
doctrines could potentially promote more accurate attributions of 
governmental responsibility, and thus more accurate assignments of 
institutional blame. 
In important respects, however, the Court’s exceptional immigration 
doctrines never fully closed the loop on where the constitutional buck 
stops.106  Regarding federal immigration authority, the existence of two 
potentially accountable institutions—Congress and the Executive—suffices 
for a blame-game quorum, as each may claim the other is responsible for 
faults in the immigration system.107  What is more, Congress delegates 
considerable amounts of immigration authority and discretion to various 
federal agencies,108 which compound the possibilities for blame attribution 
(and blame avoidance) among Congress, the president, and administrative 
officials. 
Further complicating matters, the exclusivity doctrine is not as tight as it 
once was or could be.109  Of significance, the Court has not employed the 
doctrine to preclude the federal government from devolving its immigration 
authority to state and local jurisdictions.110  For example, Congress has given 
states the option to deny state-administered welfare benefits to certain 
categories of noncitizens.111  Further, Congress has allowed for the 
deputation of state and local officials to enforce federal immigration laws.112  
 
 106. One line of the Court’s plenary-power cases suggests that the Executive has inherent 
and broad immigration power. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 
537, 544 (1950).  Meanwhile, another line of cases suggests that the Executive’s power over 
immigration is generally no different than in other areas of law, with Congress as the fount of 
lawmaking authority and delegation serving as the primary mechanism for allocating power 
elsewhere. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 (1983). 
 107. Cf. HOOD, supra note 10, at 43 (“[S]ystems of divided government and complex multi-
level government structures may offer more opportunities for blame-shifting in the sideways 
and up-and-down directions than simpler structures”). 
 108. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Political Economics of Immigration Law, 2 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 1, 45–50 (2012) (describing the fragmentation of immigration authority within 
the executive branch). 
 109. See infra notes 110–17 and accompanying text. 
 110. This practice is not without its critics. See generally Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws 
in the Inherent Authority Position:  Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws 
Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965 (2004) (lamenting and criticizing the 
federal government’s devolution of immigration authority to state and local officials); Michael 
J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry?  Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, 
and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001). 
 111. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104–193, §§ 400–51, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260–77. 
 112. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012); infra notes 287–89 and accompanying text (discussing 
federal-state enforcement arrangements). 
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How subfederal officials use, or do not use, their conferred authority can 
attract institutional blame.113 
Moreover, states have a residue of inherent power to enact laws that pertain 
to migrants.114  As interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court, the 
exclusivity doctrine forbids state laws that directly govern the admission and 
expulsion of migrants, but does not prohibit state laws that otherwise pertain 
to noncitizens residing in their jurisdiction.115  Thus, unless federally 
preempted, states and localities have some leeway to pass laws that pertain 
to migrants (e.g., regarding in-state tuition, driver’s licenses, and public-
sector jobs).116  Consequently, state and local officials are key players in the 
immigration federalism landscape.  Especially over the past decade, 
subfederal officials have been targets of institutional blame for their actions 
and omissions in the immigration arena.117  The imbroglio over sanctuary 
cities is just one of many flare-ups.118 
In sum, there is plenty of institutional blame to go around and plenty of 
public officials to share in it.  These structural conditions are very 
consequential.  As the number of potential targets of institutional blame 
expands, the opportunities for attributing, deflecting, and avoiding blame 
multiply exponentially. 
II.  PERCEPTIONS AND MISPERCEPTIONS 
This Part explains the psychology and sociology of blame.  Key insights 
from these disciplines explain how perceptions are formed and, as 
importantly, how perceptions can be systemically wrong. 
Leading theories in psychology posit that judgment formation is the 
product of a “dual-process” structure:  “System One,” which is a fast, 
instinctive, intuitive, and emotional system; and “System Two,” which is a 
slow, reflective, controlled, and effortful system.119  Important for present 
 
 113. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text; infra notes 414–15 and accompanying 
text. 
 114. The government’s official position on immigration enforcement is that it is both 
devolvable to subfederal actors and, moreover, that unless preempted, states have some 
inherent authority to enforce at least certain aspects of immigration law. See Memorandum 
from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen. of the U.S., to Attorney Gen. of the U.S. 13 (Apr. 
3, 2002), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
K33G-YVA5]. 
 115. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356–57 (1976). 
 116. See Kerry L. Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. 
REV. 1625, 1644 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court has made a sharp distinction between 
immigration law, which regulates the exclusion and deportation of aliens, and alienage law, 
which regulates their presence here”); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in 
Immigration, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 576 (2008). 
 117. See PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW 
IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM 57–86 (2015) (surveying the unprecedented uptick in state and 
local laws pertaining to noncitizens); Rodríguez, supra note 116, at 576. 
 118. See supra notes 67–75 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.C.4. 
 119. See generally DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Shelly Chaiken & 
Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) (providing a collection of articles on dual-process theories); DANIEL 
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 14, 24, 28 (2011). 
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purposes, studies in cognitive and social psychology have shown that 
judgments relating to blame are generally dominated by System One’s 
intuitive and reflexive pathways.120  System Two’s slower and more 
reflective pathways are available as a mental check.  But owing to certain 
individual and group tendencies, our first impressions about whether and 
whom to blame generally stick.121 
These insights, which I elaborate on further below, are essential for 
understanding how blame can have transformative effects—and not always 
rational ones—on the immigration system’s operation and design.  Just as 
blame can be misattributed to migrants, blame can be misattributed to public 
officials:  for instance, if the general polity fails to link policymakers to 
choices they have made or, conversely, if the polity makes a causal link 
between harm and responsibility where none exists. 
A.  Heuristics and Biases 
Studies in cognitive psychology have long shown how humans use 
heuristics and biases to digest complex questions.122  Whereas heuristics are 
instinctual strategies for processing information, biases reflect those 
tendencies in predictable ways.123  Heuristics and biases, which operate in 
System One, can be valuable for making efficient decisions.124  In some 
cases, however, these cognitive tools can lead to severe and systemic errors 
in judgment, which in turn can lead to irrational decisions.125  Moreover, at 
the group level, heuristics and biases can “fuel mass delusions that have large 
consequences for regulatory policy.”126 
 
 120. See, e.g., Feigenson, supra note 24, at 45–46; see also infra Part II.B (discussing how 
emotions, which are System One cognitions, relate to blame attribution). 
 121. See, e.g., Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 556, 556–74 (2000); Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational 
Tail:  A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814, 817 
(2001) (offering a “social intuitionist model” of moral judgment, and arguing that fast-track 
moral intuitions—rather than slow-track deductive moral reasoning—are generally what 
dictate social moral judgments); see also Neal Feigenson & Jaihyun Park, Emotions and 
Attributions of Legal Responsibility and Blame:  A Research Review, 30 LAW HUM. BEHAV. 
143, 145–48 (2006). 
 122. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:  HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (presenting early studies about human judgment in the face of 
uncertainty).  For an updated account, see generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 119. 
 123. See Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 531, 532 (2005) 
(“The use of heuristics gives rise to intuitions about what is true, and these intuitions 
sometimes are biased, in the sense that they produce errors in a predictable direction.”). 
 124. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 683, 704 (1999). 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. at 704–05.  For applications of these ideas to immigration, see, for example, 
Mary De Ming Fan, The Immigration-Terrorism Illusory Correlation and Heuristic Mistake, 
10 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 33, 37–40 (2007); Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 66, at 
1444–46.  For nonimmigration examples, see, for example, Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, 
More Statistics, Less Persuasion:  A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1291, 1313–14 (2003) and Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
751, 751 n.4, 752 n.9 (2003). 
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1.  Heuristics 
Three heuristics, in particular, are central to perceptions relating to 
immigration blame.  First, through the availability heuristic, people assess 
the frequency and probability of events with reference to how easily instances 
of the occurrence come to mind.127  Statistically, for example, it is quite rare 
for undocumented migrants to commit violent crimes.128  However, if people 
can readily recall media accounts of those events, the availability heuristic 
might cause audiences to believe that such crimes occur, or will occur, more 
often than statistical base rates suggest.  The availability heuristic can lead to 
erroneous judgments because the ease of recalling an event need not have 
any correlation to the event’s actual propensity.129 
Second, under the representativeness heuristic, people draw conclusions 
about the probability of events or things with reference to how similar (or 
not) the tested subject is compared to a reference subject.130  Put otherwise, 
judgments of probability are influenced by assessments of resemblance.  
Under the representativeness heuristic, preexisting stereotypes may guide a 
person’s judgment insofar as the person compares the known features of the 
target subject with what stereotypes make salient about the reference 
group.131  Like other mental shortcuts, the representativeness heuristic does 
not always lead to false correlations.  But it can make such errors more 
likely.132 
Third, the affect heuristic is a mental shortcut through which judgments 
are influenced by moods and emotions, such as anger, fear, and happiness.133  
Under this heuristic, information about stimuli in the perceiver’s 
environment is tagged with a mood or emotion, which in turn influences how 
perceptions and judgments are formed.134  One of many iterations of the 
 
 127. See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:  HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 122, at 3, 
11–14 (discussing the availability heuristic). 
 128. See Kevin R. Johnson, It’s the Economy, Stupid:  The Hijacking of the Debate over 
Immigration Reform by Monsters, Ghosts, and Goblins (or the War on Drugs, War on Terror, 
Narcoterrorists, Etc.), 13 CHAP. L. REV. 583, 592 (2010) (“Although immigrants are often 
blamed for crime, ample evidence demonstrates that the crime rates among immigrants are no 
greater—and often less—than among the general population.”); From Anecdotes to Evidence:  
Setting the Record Straight on Immigrants and Crime, IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR. (July 25, 2013), 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/anecdotes-evidence-setting-record-straight-
immigrants-and-crime-0 [http://perma.cc/JH8M-6E4C] (presenting evidence that immigrants 
are no more likely to engage in criminal conduct than nonimmigrants). 
 129. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 124, at 707. 
 130. See Sunstein, supra note 126, at 752. 
 131. KAHNEMAN, supra note 119, at 148–51. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES:  THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 397, 397 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002). 
 134. Id. at 409–15; see also MARTHA NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT:  THE 
INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 41–51 (2001) (discussing how emotional judgments and 
impressions may be false or mistaken); Neal R. Feigenson, Emotions, Risk Perceptions and 
Blaming in 9/11 Cases, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 959, 971–72 (2003) (discussing “affect-as-
information” as one of several ways that emotions inform judgments of blame). 
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affect heuristic, relevant to immigration blame, is the outrage heuristic.135  
Under this heuristic, punishment judgments are made to turn on the 
outrageousness of the act at issue.136  The difficult question, “what should 
the appropriate punishment be?” is subconsciously answered by a simpler 
question—to wit, “how outraged am I by the conduct in question?”137  I will 
return to the affect heuristic and the significance of blame-related emotions 
in more detail below.138 
2.  Biases 
In tandem with heuristics, biases are System One tendencies that can lead 
to misjudgments.  Negativity bias is perhaps the most important because it 
makes “bad stronger than good” across a range of political and social 
contexts relevant here.139  One manifestation of negativity bias makes people 
more prone to find fault than to give credit, with important implications for 
how and when people vote.140  Another well-known manifestation of 
negativity bias is “loss aversion,” which causes people to feel losses more 
intensely than gains.141  Further, negativity bias has recently been linked to 
political affiliation.142  Those with higher degrees of negativity bias are more 
sensitive to negative stimuli and social change, and thus tend to favor more 
conservative policies.143  Meanwhile, individuals with lower negativity bias 
are less wary of change, which can make them feel more comfortable with 
progressive policies.144 
Negativity bias has wide implications for immigration blame.  As just one 
of many examples, negativity bias may cause people to feel more 
dissatisfaction with the size of our enormous undocumented population than 
satisfaction with record-breaking deportations.145  If so, negativity bias can 
 
 135. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited:  Attribute 
Substitution, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES:  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra 
note 133, at 49, 63. 
 136. See id.; Sunstein, supra note 123, at 538. 
 137. Sunstein, supra note 123, at 538.  This sort of substitution—of a hard question with 
an easier one—is the general way that System One heuristics operate. See id. at 532–33, 538. 
 138. See infra Part II.B. 
 139. See Roy F. Baumeister et al., Bad is Stronger than Good, 5 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 323, 
354–55 (2001); Paul Rozin & Edward B. Royzman, Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance, 
and Contagion, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 296, 298–99 (2001). 
 140. HOOD, supra note 10, at 10; Weaver, supra note 13, at 371. 
 141. See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:  HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 122, at 
300–05; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 346–47 (1984). 
 142. See generally J. R. Hibbing et al., Differences in Negativity Bias Underlie Variations 
in Political Ideology, 37 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 297 (2014). 
 143. Shalom H. Schwartz, Negativity Bias and Basic Values, 37 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 328, 
328 (2014). 
 144. See Gian Vittorio Caprara et al., Personality and Politics:  Values, Traits, and 
Political Choice, 27 POL. PSYCHOL. 1, 25 (2006). 
 145. See Jens Manuel Krogstad et al., 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW 
RES. CTR. (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/27/5-facts-about-
illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/98ZX-W2AC] (estimating the unauthorized 
immigrant population at 11.3 million); Serena Marshall, Obama Has Deported More People 
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have a one-way ratcheting effect on public perceptions about the 
government’s ability to control immigration flows.  In turn, public officials 
may be more inclined to take blame-avoiding action than credit-claiming 
action, with downstream effects on immigration structures and policy.146 
Another cognitive hiccup central to immigration blame is confirmation 
bias.147  When presented with conflicting information, people tend to 
foreground information that comports with their preexisting beliefs.148  Thus, 
owing to confirmation bias, people who already think that migrants steal 
American jobs are more likely to internalize cohering reports and reject 
nonconforming information. 
Confirmation bias has also been linked to two additional phenomena 
relevant to immigration blame.  Specifically, confirmation bias can lead 
people to engage in “blame validation,” whereby blamers exaggerate 
supporting information to lock in their preexisting judgments and, in the 
process, subconsciously avoid blaming themselves or third parties who may 
be more deserving of that opprobrium.149  In a partly overlapping 
phenomenon, “cognitive dissonance” theory posits that when a person’s self-
worth or belief system is threatened, they may release the psychological 
tension through the cathartic act of blaming others.150  Those at the fringe of 
society—especially undocumented migrants of color—tend to be easy 
outlets.151  As put by Dean Kevin Johnson:  “generation after generation, the 
United States has turned to the cure-all of blaming the ‘foreigner’ for 
domestic troubles.”152 
Racial bias can also infect perceptions relating to blame.153  In the 
immigration context, racial bias is most commonly associated with the blame 
 
than Any Other President, ABC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2016, 2:05 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
Politics/obamas-deportation-policy-numbers/story?id=41715661 [https://perma.cc/U958-
KE6Z] (“Between 2009 and 2015 [the Obama] administration . . . removed more than 2.5 
million people through immigration orders . . . .”). 
 146. Cf. Weaver, supra note 13, at 393–95. 
 147. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 101, 107 
(2007) (“[R]ather than update their prior beliefs based on new information, [people] tend to 
evaluate the persuasiveness of new information based on its conformity to their experience.”); 
Jonathan J. Koehler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of Evidence 
Quality, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 28, 47 (1993). 
 148. See Koehler, supra note 147, at 47; Sunstein, supra note 126, at 762. 
 149. Experimental studies by Mark Alicke and associates indicate that subjects who 
spontaneously evaluate agents’ behavior unfavorably are apt to exaggerate agents’ causal 
control and any evidence that might favor it while de-emphasizing counterevidence. See Mark 
D. Alicke et al., Causation, Norm Violation, and Culpable Control, 108 J. PHIL. 670, 697 
(2011); Alicke, supra note 121, at 556–74. 
 150. For the classic work on cognitive dissonance, see generally LEON FESTINGER, A 
THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).  The idea has often been extended to explain 
scapegoating of putatively innocent groups, including migrants. See DOUGLAS, supra note 37, 
at 115–17; JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 50–52; McLeod, supra note 63, at 164–68. 
 151. See DOUGLAS, supra note 37, at 132–40. 
 152. See JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 87. 
 153. Stereotyping occurs when we overestimate the prevalence of a trait or characteristic 
in other people and assume that more members of the group possess the trait or characteristic 
than really do. See JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 204–08 (1988). 
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attributed to migrants of color.154  But such bias can also distort public 
perceptions of government officials, as arguably occurred, for example, 
against President Obama.155  Like other biases, racial bias can occur 
subconsciously and without ill intent.156  Understandably, most immigration 
restrictionists—including our sitting president—vehemently deny that their 
anti-immigration ideology is based on race.157  Instead, they cite to race-
neutral reasons, such as crime, the economy, and national security.158  These 
race-neutral reasons may be sincerely held.159  Through a critical-race lens, 
however, these other reasons are proxies for conscious or subconscious 
bias.160 
Importantly, racial bias can merge with other mental shortcuts, with 
compounding effects.  For instance, if audiences can easily recall accounts 
of Latino migrants committing drug crimes, then the availability heuristic 
might lead those audiences to believe that Latinos are more prone to commit 
such crimes than statistical base rates show.161  And, if people are already 
predisposed to think so, confirmation bias might lead audiences to accept 
(and maybe even seek) conforming reports.162  Meanwhile, owing to 
 
 154. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; infra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 155. Although President Obama “didn’t view racism as a major component of mainstream 
Republican opposition to his policies,” those that worked in the Obama White House “do 
identify race as a factor in consistent Republican efforts to stymie Obama’s agenda in 
Washington.” Kevin Liptak, Obama’s Candid Reflections on Race, CNN (Dec. 7, 2016, 
1:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/07/politics/obama-race-legacy/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/HXQ8-EFLY]; see also Terence Samuel, The Racist Backlash Obama Has 
Faced During His Presidency, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/obama-legacy/racial-backlash-against-
the-president.html [https://perma.cc/3FTF-JTZ4]. 
 156. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant:  A Dialogue, 
44 GA. L. REV. 1, 75 (2009) (“Xenophobia can be a cover for cruder forms of either conscious 
or unconscious bigotry, and all too often it is Latinos or Latinas who are singled out.”). 
 157. Making headlines, President Trump questioned proposed immigration protections for 
people from Haiti and some African nations, asking in a White House meeting “why he should 
accept immigrants from ‘shithole countries’ rather than from places like Norway.” Julie 
Hirschfeld Davis et al., Trump Alarms Lawmakers with Disparaging Words for Haiti and 
Africa, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/11/us/politics/trump-
shithole-countries.html [https://perma.cc/YJ6C-4YXD].  When asked days later whether he is 
racist, President Trump said, “No, I’m not a racist.  I am the least racist person you have ever 
interviewed.” Aileen Graef, Trump:  ‘I Am Not a Racist,’ CNN (Jan. 15, 2018, 12:13 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/14/politics/donald-trump-racist/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
KA9N-2C7L]. 
 158. See supra Part I.A. 
 159. Cf. D. C. McAllister, No, Trump’s Immigration Order Isn’t Racist or Reminiscent of 
the Holocaust, FEDERALIST (Jan. 30, 2017), http://thefederalist.com/2017/01/30/no-trumps-
immigration-order-isnt-racist-reminiscent-holocaust/ [https://perma.cc/WC49-B53G] (“Just 
because a racist is skeptical of refugees from terrorism-exporting countries for his own twisted 
reasons doesn’t mean all Republicans who support the policy are racist.”). 
 160. See JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 7 (“The use of proxies to discriminate obscures the true 
inequality of the law and allows for the plausible denial of a discriminatory intent while 
ensuring discriminatory results.”); Legomsky, supra note 156, at 75 (“Bigotry often drives 
people to take positions on illegal immigration that they know would be socially unacceptable 
if articulated in explicit racial terms.”). 
 161. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text (discussing the availability heuristic). 
 162. See supra notes 147–49 and accompanying text (discussing confirmation bias). 
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negativity bias, audiences are likely to feel exponentially more displeasure 
with “bad” Latino migrants than satisfaction with the “good” ones.163  
Consider, in this light, Trump’s stirring remarks during his presidential bid:  
“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. . . .  They’re 
bringing drugs.  They’re bringing crime.  They’re rapists.  And some, I 
assume, are good people.”164 
B.  Emotions 
A growing body of psychological research explains how emotions are 
integral to information processing and judgment formation.  The definition 
of “emotion” is not entirely settled, in part because scientists’ understanding 
of how the human brain works is constantly evolving.165  For present 
purposes, I use the term emotion in a conventional sense, to mean instinctive 
or intuitive feelings that assist people in appraising and reacting to stimuli in 
their surrounding environment.166  Emotions influence human thinking in at 
least four ways that pertain to blame attribution and misattribution. 
First, as already mentioned, emotional states offer information about the 
targets of our judgment through the affect heuristic.167  Thus, for example, 
people who feel angry use that emotion as an informational cue, or signal, 
that something bad has happened for which someone is responsible.168  Just 
as we might intuit that where there is smoke there is fire, so too might we 
intuit that when we feel angry (the emotion) there is someone to blame (the 
emotional cause).  In this cognitive pathway, anger is prior to blame. 
Second, anger can follow or cognitively mesh with blame.169  Suppose, for 
example, that a blamer perceives that a blamee is responsible for some 
avoidable harm.  Whatever led the blamer to those judgments can also lead 
to or merge with the structural predicates of anger.170  To be clear, anger and 
blame do not always coincide—we can blame without being angry and feel 
angry without blaming.  But the relationship between anger and blame is 
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 169. See BERNARD WEINER, JUDGMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY:  A FOUNDATION FOR A THEORY 
OF SOCIAL CONDUCT 186–98 (1995) (capturing decades of research showing that judgments 
of responsibility mattered to the perceiver’s emotional response); Brian M. Quigley & James 
T. Tedeschi, Mediating Effects of Blame Attributions on Feelings of Anger, 22 PERSONALITY 
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often fluid, reciprocal, and mutually reinforcing because the triggers of anger 
and blame substantially overlap.171  To wit, both anger and blame are 
consistent with perceptions that the target of judgment is responsible for 
some avoidable harm.172  By contrast, if the perceiver believes that someone 
has been harmed for reasons beyond that person’s control, the perceiver may 
emerge with a different emotion, such as sympathy or sadness.  Compared to 
anger, these other negative emotions tend to correlate with different attitudes 
and behaviors, such as forgiveness or aiding the victim.173 
Third, emotions can influence how we process information through 
System One and System Two.  Some emotions, like anxiety and sadness, 
cause people to feel uncertain about a situation.174  That uncertainty, in turn, 
tends to trigger deliberative and effortful System Two thinking.175  By 
contrast, anger makes a person feel more certain about a situation.176  In turn, 
that certainty makes System One processes more salient because there is no 
self-felt need for System Two’s mental check.177 
To be sure, people can (and often do) have rational reasons available to 
support System One emotional judgments.  Research shows, however, that 
such rationalization is often arrived at post hoc.178  Thus, even when we think 
that our System Two processes did the evaluative work, our System One 
pathways may have predetermined the outcome.179 
Also worth emphasizing here is the relationship between emotions in 
general and the affect heuristic in particular.180  As earlier discussed, the 
affect heuristic is a System One mechanism that uses emotions as a source of 
information about the target of judgment (e.g., whether the target is 
responsible for harm).  But more generally, emotions can also affect how we 
process information (e.g., fast or slow).  If so, then all of the heuristics and 
biases—not only the affect heuristic—may be triggered by emotions. 
Fourth, emotions can mediate a person’s decisions of whether, whom, or 
what to blame.  People who feel angry are more inclined to perceive harm 
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because the emotion’s negative valence makes their surroundings appear 
more negative.181  Further, when harm is detected, anger can skew 
perceptions of causal responsibility toward individuals rather than toward 
situations.182  Thus, for example, an angry person may blame undocumented 
migrants for crossing the U.S. border or blame the president for taking 
unilateral action (i.e., blame individuals).  Meanwhile, a person who feels sad 
or sympathetic might blame our unjustified immigration system or political 
dysfunction (i.e., blame situations).183 
Relatedly, emotions can affect assessments of risk and probability.184  For 
present purposes, risk perceptions are important insofar as immigration is (or 
is made to be) a type of risk regulation.  What is the risk that migrants will 
steal American jobs?  What is the risk that migrants are or will become 
terrorists, gang members, or criminals?  What is the risk that granting 
amnesty will lead to new waves of undocumented migration?  What is the 
risk that an asylum seeker will be turned away and tortured or killed upon 
repatriation?  What is the risk of political backlash against a legislator who 
casts a vote in favor of funding a border wall? 
In Part II.A, this Article discussed how non-emotional heuristics and 
biases might influence judgments and choices about risk in the face of 
uncertainty.  Likewise, emotions such as anger, fear, and anxiety will 
influence how the polity and public officials answer risk-related questions.  
In general, fearful people are prone to think that bad things will happen to 
them; as a consequence, they are prone to make pessimistic risk 
assessments.185  By contrast, angry people are less likely to think that bad 
things will happen, in part because angry people have an inflated sense of 
certainty and control over their environment.186  As a consequence, people 
experiencing anger tend to make optimistic risk assessments.  Thus, whether 
from anger, fear, or both, estimates of the likelihood and seriousness of 
various risks often diverge from the objective probability and severity of 
those risks.187 
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Finally, as we all know from experience, emotions can influence not only 
how we think, but also how we behave.188  For example, when we feel angry, 
happy, fearful, or sympathetic, we may act in ways that we otherwise might 
not if we felt differently.  Moreover, the intensity of our emotions can 
mediate our motivations to act.189  If we are feeling only a little angry, a little 
happy, a little afraid, or a little sympathetic, we might not act on those 
emotions.  Yet we might be more inclined to do so if we are outraged, 
ecstatic, terrified, or highly sympathetic.  Thus, emotions can have significant 
implications for whether and how people vote, whether and how people 
publicly protest or support government policies, and so on.  Likewise, the 
type and intensity of emotions can bear on the actions of public officials, 
directly or indirectly.190 
C.  Cultural Influences 
A dominant strand of cultural theory posits that people hold “worldviews,” 
which are latent preferences about how society should be organized.191  
Pertinent here, cultural theory suggests that a person’s worldview will 
influence his or her judgments of blame.192  More specifically, an event or 
policy may register (or not) as an avoidable harm depending on the 
perceiver’s worldview; likewise, causal attributions of responsibility may 
hinge on the perceiver’s worldview. 
For example, under a “hierarchist” worldview, blame should attach to 
those who do not follow the rules or respect authority.193  Under an 
“egalitarian” worldview, blame should attach to those who flout popular 
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opinion or who act without group support.194  Under an “individualist” 
worldview, blame should attach to those who are considered personally inept 
or maladroit, which raises the prospect of blaming the victim.195 
Related research in “cultural cognition” adds psychological insights.196  
According to this nascent branch of cultural theory, “culture is prior to 
facts.”197  Thus, people’s worldviews will anchor their perceptions of risk 
and harm, operate as a screen through which heuristics and biases work, and 
mediate emotional responses.198 
Recall that under the availability heuristic, people make judgments about 
the propensity of an event based on how easily (or not) similar events come 
to mind.199  But which events will leave an impression and be remembered 
when the availability heuristic is triggered?  Cultural-cognition theory offers 
an answer:  a person’s worldview will influence the saliency and recall of 
events in a person’s mind.200  People tend to take note of and assign 
significance to instances of harm associated with behavior they despise—a 
tendency reinforced by negativity bias.201 
Relatedly, cultural-cognition theory provides a gloss on confirmation bias.  
Recall that under that bias, people tend to seek out and believe information 
that coheres with their preexisting beliefs.202  But what is the source and 
nature of those preexisting beliefs?  Here again, cultural worldviews are part 
of the answer—at least in hot-button contexts, such as immigration, where a 
person’s worldview is likely to feel threatened by competing worldviews.203 
A person’s cultural worldview may also influence their emotional reaction 
to information and events.204  If an immigration-related activity or policy 
prompts fear, anger, sympathy, or another emotion, chances are that the 
emotions elicited, and whom they are directed at, will reflect and reinforce a 
person’s preferences about how society should be structured.205 
Through these and other psychological mechanisms, groups of like-
minded individuals polarize, not only around subjective societal values, but 
also around ostensibly objective facts.206  As Dan Kahan explains, the fit 
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between an expert’s position and the one congenial to a person’s cultural 
predisposition is what causes that person “to take note of that expert’s view, 
to assign significance to it, and thereafter recall it.”207  What is more, studies 
in cultural cognition show that people tend to credit or discredit an expert’s 
factual assessments depending on whether the expert shares the perceiver’s 
worldview.208  Thus, cultural-cognition theory predicts that when lay people 
are faced with conflicting empirical accounts of immigration crime, 
undocumented employment, and so on, they will gravitate toward the 
opinions of their trusted, culturally aligned experts. 
D.  Packaging and Presentation 
In light of the foregoing, judgments and behaviors relating to blame can 
be heavily influenced by how information is packaged and presented.  More 
specifically, the way information is packaged and presented will affect how 
it is processed, both at the individual and group levels.209  The discussion 
here focuses on three styles of messaging that saturate immigration blame:  
narratives, metaphors, and framing. 
Narratives generally convey information through qualitative anecdotes.210  
Whether factual or fictional, narratives are indispensable to how people 
perceive and understand the world around them.211  Moreover, narratives hit 
cognitive chords that pie charts and number-crunching studies miss.212  For 
example, the backstories about a family torn apart by deportation,213 or the 
gory details of a migrant’s violent crime,214 invoke different and deeper 
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emotional reactions than phlegmatic statistics about deportation and crime 
rates. 
Metaphors are another way that information can be conveyed and 
translated into blame.215  A metaphor is “a figure of speech in which a word 
or phrase literally denoting one kind of object or idea is used in place of 
another to suggest a likeness or analogy between them.”216  Research in 
cognitive linguistics demonstrates that people view the world in metaphoric 
terms.217  For purposes of blame attribution, metaphors can thus affect our 
perceptions of harm and responsibility.218  Take, for instance, the “flood of 
immigrants” metaphor.219  This metaphor conveys an uncontrollable, and 
perhaps destructive, influx of noncitizens.220  Statistical reports on the 
numbers and effects of migrants in the country would come closer to some 
objective truth.  The flood metaphor, however, is catchier, more likely to 
drive perceptions about harm, and thus more likely to factor into attributions 
of blame.  For an institutional example, consider “congressional gridlock.”  
This metaphor conveys more than legislative stasis—it conveys a feeling or 
sense of frustration.221  Of course, the causes of legislative stasis and traffic 
jams are quite different.  But the metaphor connects the two in ways that can 
alter how we understand congressional inaction. 
The manner in which information is framed can also affect how that 
information is processed and folded into blame-related judgments.  Through 
framing adjustments, the very same thing or event may be cast in two (or 
more) different lights.222  For example, does high-volume migration yield 
“cultural diversity,” as integrationists contend, or “cultural contamination,” 
as some restrictionists contend?  Are migrants “our neighbors” or “invading 
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strangers”?223  Are unaccompanied minors seeking refuge at our border 
victims of gang-related violence in their home countries, or future gang 
members in ours?224 
Other types of framing adjustments zoom in or out, to capture a different 
mix of considerations that may bear on attributions of blame.  For instance, 
the Obama administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA) program may strike observers as more or less blameworthy, 
depending on whether it is viewed in isolation or conjunction with his 
administration’s subsequent Deferred Action for Parents of Americans 
(DAPA) program.225  Likewise, President Trump’s third travel ban may 
strike observers as more or less blameworthy depending on whether it is 
viewed in conjunction with his prior travel bans, his campaign rhetoric 
calling for a “Muslim ban,” and so on.226  In short, context matters when 
assigning blame.  And the context that matters depends on how information 
is framed. 
More generally, framing effects can also influence how information is 
mentally processed—that is, through System One (fast and reflexive) and 
System Two (slow and reflective).  For instance, according to prospect 
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theory, information that is framed as a “loss” will register in System One 
more intensely than if the same information is presented as a “gain.”227 
E.  “Blame Cascades” 
At the group level—where psychology and sociology meet—heuristics, 
biases, emotions, and cultural cognition can have snowballing effects on 
society or subcommunities within it.228 
Most significantly, availability cascades can seriously distort group 
perceptions about risk and harm.229  An availability cascade “is a self-
reinforcing process . . . by which an expressed perception triggers a chain 
reaction that gives the perception increasing plausibility through its rising 
availability in public discourse.”230  Thus, for example, the more that people 
hear narratives of hardworking or criminal migrants, the more easily these 
narratives come to mind.  And the more easily they come to mind, the more 
readily they may be repeated, retweeted, and recycled in social discourse. 
Extending these insights, this Article introduces the idea of blame 
cascades.  A blame cascade occurs when avalanching perceptions of 
avoidable harm and responsibility lead to widespread blame.231  Publicity 
given to blaming of certain targets for certain harms adds social proof, and 
reinforces, whom or what to blame.  In extreme form, large segments of 
society may blame migrants or public officials without independently 
assessing whether blame is warranted.  For instance, when enough people 
blame migrants for such and so, or the president for this and that, more people 
may jump on those group bandwagons, even though they might not have 
blamed in their individual capacity.232 
Blame cascades can occur organically and spontaneously.  But they can 
also be strategically manufactured by politicians, advocates, and social elites, 
who employ narratives, metaphors, and framing devices to shape and 
maintain public perceptions.233  In a blame cascade, the objectively weaker 
 
 227. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:  An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 279–80 (1979). 
 228. See Sunstein, supra note 126, at 757–59 (positing the existence of availability 
cascades, where “media coverage of gripping, unrepresentative incidents” creates durable and 
empirically invalid social beliefs about social phenomena); see also supra Part II.C (discussing 
how cultural worldviews contribute to tribalism and polarization). 
 229. See Sunstein, supra note 126, at 757–59. 
 230. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 124, at 683. 
 231. Cf. id. at 761–62 (explaining that, for reputational reasons, people often believe 
something because others appear to believe it; or they feign conviction to avoid reputational 
harm); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions Against What?  The Availability Heuristic and 
Cross-Cultural Risk Perceptions, 57 ALA. L. REV. 75, 94–96 (2005) (describing a social 
phenomenon whereby information and beliefs are passed along from person to person, each 
of whom is too busy to apply his or her own analysis). 
 232. Cf. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 124, at 703 (“[P]eople tended to form their risk 
judgments largely, if not entirely, on the basis of information produced through a social 
process, rather than through personal experience or investigation.”). 
 233. Id. at 687–88 (characterizing the activity of policy entrepreneurs); Sunstein, supra 
note 126, at 758–59 (“Many perceived ‘epidemics’ are in reality no such thing, but instead a 
product of media coverage of gripping, unrepresentative incidents.”); see also FRANK FUREDI, 
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side of a debate may triumph simply by exploiting audiences’ cognitive 
shortcuts, stoking the right emotions, and reaching targeted audiences at the 
right times.234 
The twenty-four-hour news cycle exacerbates the potential for blame 
cascades, both organic and manufactured.  Sensationalism sells.  Owing to 
audiences’ negativity bias, negative sensationalism sells even better.235  And 
with new technologies and social platforms, our exposure to information is 
seldom more than a few clicks or swipes away.236 
*          *          * 
The foregoing discussion offered an account of how blame is attributed to 
migrants and public officials in the immigration context; how legal structures 
may inform or confound those judgments; and how heuristics, biases, 
emotions, and cultural worldviews factor in.  But blame attribution is only 
part of the story.  In life and politics, the impulse to lay blame is often met 
with the impulse to avoid it.237  In conjunction with blame attribution, blame 
avoidance is an essential feature of immigration blame.  The discussion 
below elaborates. 
III.  BLAME AVOIDANCE 
The term “blame avoidance” is used here to describe a range of actions 
that individuals and groups employ to escape, minimize, or diffuse blame.238  
This Part provides a typology of blame-avoidance strategies, drawn from 
studies in political science and sociology.239  Generally speaking, there are 
three ways to avoid blame.  First, blame avoiders can try to refute or mitigate 
perceptions of avoidable harm.  Second, blame avoiders can try to shape or 
reshape perceptions of responsibility for the harm at issue.  In the absence of 
 
POLITICS OF FEAR 123–41 (2005) (discussing the rise of “fear entrepreneurs” in modern 
societies); Fan, supra note 126, at 45–46 (noting that people can erroneously rely on illusory 
correlations manufactured by others). 
 234. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 124, at 713–14. 
 235. Cf. KAHNEMAN, supra note 119, at 301 (“The brains of humans and other animals 
contain a mechanism that is designed to give priority to bad news.”); Sunstein, supra note 126, 
at 758–59. 
 236. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC:  DIVIDED REPUBLIC IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
98–108 (2017) (describing how the online world creates “cybercascades” and political 
fragmentation). 
 237. See D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini, The Contours of Blame, in BLAME:  ITS 
NATURE AND NORMS, supra note 1, at 3, 9 (“Judgments [of blame] are tinged with normativity, 
and because of this carry a certain force:  they are the sorts of judgments that we would rather 
not have made about us.”); Hood, supra note 3, at 167–71 (discussing the impulse and 
incentives for public officials to avoid blame). 
 238. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 4–6; Weaver, supra note 13, at 375. 
 239. For some of the key works, see generally RICHARD J. ELLIS, PRESIDENTIAL LIGHTNING 
RODS:  THE POLITICS OF BLAME AVOIDANCE (1994); HOOD, supra note 10; BARRY R. 
SCHLENKER, IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT:  THE SELF-CONCEPT, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND 
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS (1980); and Weaver, supra note 13. 
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perceived harm or responsibility, blame generally will not attach.240  Third, 
an otherwise blameworthy act or omission might be excused or justified.241 
In turn, these generic blame-avoiding methods can be pursued in a variety 
of ways.  As captured by political scientist Christopher Hood, blame-
avoidance tactics generally fall into one or more of the following categories:  
(1) presentational strategies; (2) agency strategies; and (3) policy 
strategies.242  For migrants and public officials alike, blame avoidance can 
be more or less convincing, more or less obvious, and more or less valuable 
to public discourse and outcomes.243 
A.  Presentational Strategies 
Blame avoiders select which information to offer, when to offer it, and 
how to present it.244  These presentational tactics are generally available to 
all the relevant players in immigration blame (migrants, public officials, and 
their respective advocates and spokespersons).  Instructively, the same 
cognitive, social, and political dynamics that feed blame attribution also 
support presentational blame avoidance.245  Thus, for instance, politicians 
and immigrant advocates employ narratives, metaphors, and framing 
techniques to avoid blame.  Moreover, these blame-avoiding tactics get 
amplified, spread, and filtered through policy entrepreneurs and mass-media 
outlets. 
In addition, excuses and justifications are common to presentational blame 
avoidance.  Whereas excuses generally try to negate perceptions of harm and 
responsibility, justifications are positive attempts to turn blame into credit.246  
When attributions of blame turn on the blamee’s motivations (e.g., 
intentionality), excuses and justifications can negate or mitigate 
culpability.247  For instance, it is one thing if a public official intended to 
discriminate against migrants on racial grounds, but another thing if official 
action unintentionally had a disparate impact on migrants of color.  
Depending on perspective, and context, the lack of intentionality may 
mitigate institutional blame.  More generally, excuses and justifications play 
 
 240. Or, so I argue. See infra notes 448–52 and accompanying text (calling for an ethic of 
blaming only blameworthy action). 
 241. See SHAVER, supra note 13, at vii (“[Blame] is the outcome of a process that begins 
with an event having negative consequences, involves judgments about causality, personal 
responsibility, and possible mitigation.”); infra Part III.A and accompanying text (discussing 
excuses and justifications). 
 242. See generally HOOD, supra note 10 (offering a detailed study of these blame-avoidance 
strategies in public governance). 
 243. See infra Part V (discussing the values and pathologies of immigration blame). 
 244. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 17 (offering a generalized account of presentational 
tactics in public administration). 
 245. See supra Part II (discussing the psychological and social processes of attributing and 
misattributing blame). 
 246. See J. L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses:  The Presidential Address, 57 PROC. 
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 1, 2 (1956) (distinguishing excuses from justifications). 
 247. All else equal, we are more likely to blame a person who deliberately caused harm 
than we are to blame a person without such intentions. See Alicke, supra note 121, at 559–61; 
Solan, supra note 1, at 1019. 
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important roles in our social and legal ordering.  They direct attention to what 
should (and should not) matter in any given context where blaming 
judgments loom.248 
1.  Migrant Blame Avoidance 
For purely humanistic reasons, migrants have incentives to avoid being 
blamed—especially when the blame is misattributed or invidiously 
concocted.  Another reason to avoid blame, however, is more pragmatic:  the 
prospects of a migrant’s legal and social membership may depend on public 
perceptions about the migrant’s relative blameworthiness.249 
At the individual level, perceptions of blame can make the difference of 
whether a migrant is targeted for deportation or eligible for discretionary 
relief.250  At the group level, which is my focus, relative degrees of blame 
can inform how immigration laws are shaped and implemented.251 
Today’s amnesty debates provide useful illustrations of presentational 
tactics for avoiding migrant blame at the macrolevel.  Broadly defined, 
amnesty denotes a process through which unauthorized migrants may 
transition to legal status.252  The very idea of immigration amnesty 
presupposes an underlying legal violation (most commonly, for unlawful 
entry or overstaying a visa).253 
All mainstream arguments for amnesty offer excuses.  The most common 
take a “yes-but” form.  For example:  yes the law was broken, but 
undocumented presence is a minor offense.254  Other yes-but excuses provide 
morally grounded, emotion-provoking explanations for the immigration 
infraction:  yes the law was broken, but by individuals who were simply 
trying to provide a better life for their families or to escape social strife in 
their home countries.255  Another variation works on the time dimension:  yes 
the law was broken, but the passage of time and the migrant’s resulting ties 
 
 248. Erin I. Kelly, What Is an Excuse?, in BLAME:  ITS NATURE AND NORMS, supra note 1, 
at 244, 244–45, 256 (“In evaluating an agent’s blameworthiness, we assess how reasonable it 
is to expect an agent to act morally in the face of obstacles. . . .  [M]orality itself requires that 
we relax our expectations that [the agent] should have [acted differently].”). 
 249. See infra Part IV (further developing these claims). 
 250. Some deportable migrants may be entitled to statutory and equitable forms of relief. 
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012) (cancellation of removal).  However, the availability of 
those discretionary outlets is also heavily informed by perceptions of blame. See id. 
§ 1229b(b) (permitting certain deportable noncitizens to avoid removal and adjust to legal 
status if certain conditions are met, including “good moral character” and a favorable grant of 
discretion).  For an excellent account of how narratives of “good” and “bad” migrants can 
affect immigration outcomes in immigration court, see generally Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond 
Saints and Sinners:  Discretion and the Need for New Narratives in the U.S. Immigration 
System, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207 (2012). 
 251. See Keyes, supra note 250, at 226–27. 
 252. Linda Bosniak, Amnesty in Immigration:  Forgetting, Forgiving, Freedom, in THE 
MARGINS OF CITIZENSHIP 26, 26 (Philip Cook & Jonathan Seglow eds., 2014). 
 253. Id. at 28, 34. 
 254. Id. 
 255. MOTOMURA, supra note 51, at 172–207 (providing a morally based account for a 
broadscale legalization program). 
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to the community create a moral claim to stay.256  Under this time-and-ties 
framing, “the immigrant was once, but is no longer, blameworthy.”257 
Other excuses are relativistic.  Explicitly or implicitly, distinctions are 
drawn in amnesty proposals between children and adults,258 criminals and 
noncriminals,259 violent criminals and nonviolent criminals,260 longtime 
residents and new arrivals,261 and present versus future migrants.262  In each 
of these examples, one subcategory of migrants is arguably more excusable, 
and thus less blameworthy, than another subcategory of migrants.  Although 
often unintended, these juxtapositions can result in a type of scapegoating 
among scapegoats, whereby migrant blame is scaled from most to least 
deserving.263  Other forms of relativistic excuses are redirectional in a 
different sense:  they shift attention from one harm (the migrant’s legal 
 
 256. Political philosopher Joseph Carens has argued that “[p]eople who live and work and 
raise their families in a society become members, whatever their legal status.” JOSEPH H. 
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Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001); see 
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COUNCIL (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/dream-act-
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immigration reform. See, e.g., Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 
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apart from more inclusive amnesty programs. See, e.g., Dream Act of 2017, S. 1615, 115th 
Cong. (2017); DREAM Act of 2011, S. 952, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 259. Cházaro, supra note 61, at 374 (arguing that the “[w]e are not criminals, we are 
workers” pro-amnesty slogan makes migrants who commit crime more vulnerable to harsh 
immigration treatment). 
 260. See, e.g., S. 1615 § 3(b)(1)(C)(iii) (disqualifying potential beneficiaries who have 
been convicted of certain types or numbers of offenses). 
 261. See, e.g., id. § 3(b)(1)(A) (limiting protected status to those who have “been 
continuously physically present in the United States since the date that is 4 years before the 
date of the enactment of this Act”). 
 262. See Cházaro, supra note 61, at 360–61 (“If a [comprehensive immigration reform] bill 
passed today, those currently unlikely to benefit from a legalization strategy . . . would face 
even greater vulnerability . . . .”). 
 263. “In modern times, the term scapegoat has been used to describe a relatively powerless 
innocent who is made to take the blame for something that is not his fault.” DOUGLAS, supra 
note 37, at 109; see also Elliot Aronson, Persuasion Via Self-Justification:  Large 
Commitments for Small Rewards, in RETROSPECTIONS ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 3, 3 (Leon 
Festinger ed., 1980); Cházaro, supra note 61, at 413 (“In pushing forward narratives about 
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transgression) to weightier harms (e.g., a de facto caste system, opportunity 
costs to the country, and so on). 
Moreover, “no-harm-no-foul” excuses are mainstays in the pro-amnesty 
toolbox.  Through statistical proof or otherwise, amnesty advocates work to 
negate or mitigate allegations that undocumented migrants depress wages, 
increase net crime, threaten national security, and so on.264 
Beyond excuses, some amnesty advocates offer justifications, which try to 
turn blame into credit.265  To the extent that America’s immigration laws are 
de facto discriminatory, or otherwise immoral, the justificatory claim is that 
amnesty can vindicate American values.266  More generally, amnesty 
advocates try to depict undocumented migrants in a favorable light.  These 
positive accounts are supported and amplified by narratives about 
hardworking, family-centric, law-abiding undocumented migrants.267  To 
complement these narratives, metaphors about families “torn apart,” or 
“living in the shadows” of a “broken” immigration system, are offered as 
reasons for a “pathway” to citizenship.268 
Employing these and other presentational tactics, amnesty advocates try to 
replace or complicate the space otherwise occupied by retributive attitudes 
associated with anger and fear.269  System One cognitions are more likely to 
be mediated and checked by System Two if a person is made to feel 
emotionally conflicted.270  Thus, presentational tactics that conjure emotions 
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Illegal Immigrants, FOX NEWS (Sept. 28, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/09/28 
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Immigrants Out of the Shadows, HILL (Apr. 25, 2017, 9:30 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs 
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shadows [https://perma.cc/RFE6-92Y4]; Ricky Walters, My Experience with the Broken 
Immigration System, HUFFINGTON POST (June 22, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
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such as sadness, sympathy, or mercy, may help to counteract anti-amnesty 
rhetoric.271 
2.  Institutional Blame Avoidance 
Like migrants, public officials utilize a range of presentational tactics to 
avoid institutional blame.  For instance, a public official that is blamed for an 
immigration policy may argue that it was justified because, even if costly in 
the short term, the benefits of the policy will more than pay off in the long 
term.272  In this example, the justification seeks to garner credit for the very 
thing the public official is being blamed for. 
Alternatively, or additionally, the same public official might offer an 
excuse, like “my hands were tied” or “I voted against the policy.”273  Notice 
that these sorts of excuses acknowledge harm, but deny responsibility ex 
post, when institutional blame comes home to roost.  For a recent and 
prominent example, consider President Trump’s attempt to deflect blame for 
the separation of children from parents entering the country unlawfully.  
Between May 5 and June 9, 2018, federal agents separated more than 2300 
children from parents who were prosecuted for crimes relating to unlawful 
entry.274  Facing widespread criticism for these family separations, President 
Trump and his top administrative officials acknowledged that the underlying 
“law” was “horrible” and harmful to children.275  What the Trump 
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political circumstances.  It’s not what I want.  It’s what I’m forced to accept because of the 
realities.” Id. 
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administration denied, however, was responsibility for these harms.276  I will 
return to this blame episode later;277 here, it is simply offered as an example 
of ex post presentational blame avoidance. 
In other cases, public officials try to renounce responsibility, ex ante, to 
keep constituent expectations in check and institutional blame focused 
elsewhere.  A prominent example is the Obama administration’s early denials 
of authority to unilaterally grant wide-scale relief to undocumented 
migrants.278  As it turned out, this attempt at blame avoidance proved futile 
and set in motion a series of subsequent presentational and policy tactics—
most notably DACA and DAPA.279  I will return to this episode, too, in later 
parts of the discussion.280 
B.  Agency Strategies 
Public officials may also avoid blame through agency strategies, which 
generally involve attempts to deflect or limit blame by (re)allocating 
responsibility.281  Unlike rhetorical finger-pointing (which is a presentational 
tactic), agency strategies to avoid blame actually alter responsibility through 
legal structures and other arrangements. 
For instance, and perhaps most significantly, officials may delegate 
decision-making authority with the intent or effect of avoiding institutional 
blame.282  With respect to immigration, Congress delegates enforcement and 
policymaking authority to various executive officials—ranging from the 
president to various agency heads (e.g., Secretary of State, Attorney General, 
Secretary of Homeland Security), sometimes with overlapping or 
intersecting responsibilities.283  In turn, high-level federal officials can 
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delegate downward to midlevel officials, who in turn may delegate to 
frontline officials.284  When successful, these conferrals of authority shift or 
diffuse responsibility away from the delegating authority and toward other 
individuals or institutions that can serve as “lightning rods” if and when 
things go wrong.285 
Apart from delegating downward, public officials can avoid blame through 
intergovernmental partnerships and arrangements.286  An immigration 
example may be “Section 287(g) agreements,” whereby the federal 
government cross deputizes subfederal officers to enforce federal 
immigration law.287  Separately, under the Secure Communities program 
(“SComm”), fingerprints of every person arrested and booked by state and 
local police are automatically entered into a federal database.288  Via this 
intergovernmental arrangement, federal immigration officials are 
automatically alerted when an arrestee is a noncitizen.289 
Alternatively, or additionally, government officials may enter into public-
private partnerships through contracting or regulatory controls.  Examples of 
the former include public-private contracts for immigration detention 
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Priorities and the Factors That Undermine Them, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Nov. 9, 2010), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/ices-enforcement-priorities-and-
factors-undermine-them [https://perma.cc/8AXX-LDHC].  Between 2006 and 2015, over 
402,000 immigrants were identified for deportation through these partnership arrangements. 
Memorandum from John F. Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan 
et al. (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_ 
Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-Security-Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-
Policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4DW-ZCBV]. 
 288. In 2014, under pressure from immigrant advocates and subfederal officials, the Obama 
administration replaced SComm with the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP). Memorandum 
from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, 
Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, et al. 1 (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_ 
communities.pdf [https://perma.cc/LT7D-HEXS] (“The Secure Communities program, as we 
know it, will be discontinued.”); see also Juliet P. Stumpf, D(e)volving Discretion:  Lessons 
from the Life and Times of Secure Communities, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1259, 1282–84 (2015) 
(discussing the similarities and differences between PEP and SComm).  Upon taking office, 
President Trump rescinded PEP and reverted to the SComm program. See Enhancing Public 
Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768 § 10(a), 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 
(Jan. 25, 2017). 
 289. See Stumpf, supra note 288, at 1260, 1267–68 (explaining the SComm program). 
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facilities.290  Examples of the latter include laws that place legal 
responsibilities on employers to enforce immigration labor restrictions.291 
Proving that any particular delegation or partnering arrangement is 
motivated by blame avoidance is beyond what I can hope to accomplish here.  
Yet even if a delegation or partnering is not motivated to avoid blame ex ante, 
the resulting arrangements offer ex post presentational outs.  For instance, a 
legislator who was not motivated to avoid blame when delegating a decision 
may try to avoid blame through excuses or justifications for any downstream 
harms. 
C.  Policy Strategies 
A third set of blame-avoiding tactics falls under the rubric of policy 
strategies.292  Such blame avoidance may be achieved by policies that reduce 
the chance of avoidable harm occurring, or reduce the chance that avoidable 
harm will be detected or easily traced.293 
The policies designed to avoid blame can be substantive or procedural.  
Substantive policies directly affect rights and obligations, such as laws 
pertaining to the requirements of lawful admission, grounds for immigration 
removal, sanctuary policies, macrolevel federal enforcement policies, and so 
on.  Procedural policies, by contrast, denote operational protocols, so that any 
resulting harms can be met with a ready-packaged excuse of having ticked 
all the boxes.294  For instance, procedural rights for immigrants can minimize 
errors in administrative adjudication, and thus minimize the risk of being 
blamed for mistakes like deporting U.S. citizens.295  And, insofar as such 
errors occur, robust protocols may allow the agency to avoid some blame on 
the basis (i.e., excuse) that it had followed established procedure.296 
Likewise, the use of federal databases, which underlays SComm, can 
eliminate or reduce subfederal discretionary choices about which migrants to 
refer to federal immigration officials.297  By reducing discretion through 
automation, the federal government may hope to avoid being blamed for 
delegating too much discretion to subfederal officials; meanwhile, subfederal 
 
 290. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2012) (authorizing the outsourcing of immigration detention); 
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. 
REV. 1346, 1371 (2014). 
 291. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a), (e) (2012); Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in 
the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1110–13 (2009). 
 292. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 91–107 (cataloguing and discussing a broad range of 
blame-avoiding policy strategies). 
 293. See generally id. 
 294. See Hood, supra note 3, at 170–71. 
 295. Cf. Meredith Hoffman, The US Keeps Mistakenly Deporting Its Own Citizens, VICE 
NEWS (Mar. 8, 2016), https://news.vice.com/article/the-us-keeps-mistakenly-deporting-its-
own-citizens [https://perma.cc/9FW8-6ZET]. 
 296. See, e.g., Wendy Feliz, U.S. Settles with 4-Year-Old U.S. Citizen They Wrongfully 
Deported, IMMIGR. IMPACT (July 2, 2015), http://immigrationimpact.com/2015/07/02/ 
u-s-settles-with-4-year-old-u-s-citizen-they-wrongfully-deported/ [https://perma.cc/AN97-
7CAZ]. 
 297. See supra notes 288–89 and accompanying text (discussing the SComm program). 
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officials might avoid blame for alerting federal authorities, on the excuse that 
the information was automatically shared in the normal course of 
operations.298 
To be sure, in these and other examples, the underlying policies may be 
ill-advised.  But that is the part of the point:  the policies that emerge from 
institutional blame avoidance are sometimes ill-advised. 
D.  Limitations 
All of the blame-avoidance strategies discussed above have situational 
limits.  For instance, the efficacy of presentational tactics depends on a range 
of contextually contingent factors—including, most obviously, the 
credibility (or not) of the information at issue, as well as the credibility (or 
not) of the blamer and blamee.  Thus, a blame avoider will not be excused if 
the “facts” clearly show the blamee is culpable in the relevant sense. 
Moreover, if a blame avoider always has some excuse, and never takes 
responsibility, such tactics can have diminishing returns.  Indeed, blame 
avoidance can have negative returns; for instance, when a migrant’s or 
official’s rhetorical attempt to avoid blame is deemed to be a blameworthy 
act itself.299  Strategically minded advocates may thus self-regulate, and 
perhaps limit, their presentational blame-avoidance tactics accordingly. 
Agency strategies to avoid blame also have contextual limits.  The 
Constitution, statutes, administrative rules, and judicial doctrines place limits 
on how government powers may be organized and operationalized.300  Even 
within the bounds of law, reshuffling formal lines of authority—through 
delegation, governmental partnerships, or otherwise—will not invariably 
deflect blame.  For instance, key constituents can hold members of Congress 
responsible for delegating a decision.301  Similarly, a president who 
relinquishes control over an issue may be blamed for not taking a more 
hands-on approach.302 
 
 298. Cf. Martin, supra note 272, at 443 (explaining that “key federal officials viewed 
[SComm] as presenting fewer risks of inappropriate [local enforcement] behavior than, for 
example, Section 287(g) task force agreements, because local officers have no occasion to 
make immigration status decisions as part of the [SComm] process; they were expected simply 
to continue making arrests for crimes within their own clear jurisdiction”).  As it turned out, 
however, other discretionary aspects of the process—including which individuals to arrest in 
the first place, whether to honor subsequent federal detainer requests, and which arrestees to 
deport—attracted considerable amounts of institutional blame. See id. at 439–43 (discussing 
the causes and effects of these programmatic snags); see also Hiroshi Motomura, The 
Discretion that Matters:  Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the 
Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1153–57 (2011). 
 299. The Trump administration’s attempt to pin responsibility for family separation on 
other institutional actors is a case in point. See infra notes 357–60 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra Part I.B. 
 301. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 75. 
 302. Under that scenario, a strategically minded president might become actively involved 
because, if blame is going to attach anyway, the White House might gain credibility (or even 
credit) for taking ownership of hard decisions.  See ELLIS, supra note 239, at 169–70. 
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Policy tactics have their limits too, which may be reached when there are 
no blame-free or low-blame options available.  For instance, the 
advancement of a particular policy may attract blame from key constituents, 
whereas an alternative policy may attract blame from the same (or other) 
constituents.  In these scenarios, policymakers may endeavor to select the 
least-worst options, but some institutional blame is inevitable.  Moreover, 
when blame games are set to multiplayer mode—as they invariably are in the 
immigration context—attempts to avoid blame will be limited by the efficacy 
of blame avoidance counterstrategies. 
Finally, as earlier discussed, blame attribution can be heavily influenced 
by cultural worldviews.303  For many of the same reasons, the efficacy of 
blame avoidance can be culturally contingent.  Depending on cultural 
context, people’s worldviews can make them more or less likely to give 
uptake to different blame-avoiding tactics.  For example, all else equal, an 
excuse from an administrative official that “I was just following the 
President’s orders” is far more likely to register with hierarchists than with 
egalitarians.  Meanwhile, an excuse from an undocumented migrant that she 
came to America for a better life is more likely to register with individualists 
(for whom individuals are expected to secure their own needs) than with 
hierarchists (who are comfortable with social stratification and intolerant of 
lawbreaking).304 
IV.  DYNAMIC IMMIGRATION BLAME 
Thus far, I have identified and explained four operative features of 
immigration blame:  (1) migrant blame; (2) institutional blame; (3) blame 
attribution; and (4) blame avoidance.  This Part coordinates them into a 
dynamic model.  It then applies the model to a set of illustrative case studies, 
which build on and connect some earlier examples. 
A.  Piecing It Together 
As modeled here, the features of immigration blame are both substantive 
and process oriented.  Substantively, migrant blame and institutional blame 
involve judgments about whether migrants and public officials are 
responsible for avoidable harm.  Along the process dimension, blame 
attribution involves cognitive and expressive acts of blaming others, while 
blame avoidance involves a range of tactics to evade, refute, disperse, and 
mitigate attributions of blame. 
The matrix below captures these dimensions, with thumbnail examples of 
each: 
 
 303. See supra Part II.C. 
 304. Cf. Kahan, supra note 147, at 153–54 (summarizing the general preferences of cultural 
worldviews).  As far as I am aware, immigration regulation has not been the subject of any 
empirical studies in cultural cognition.  But, for studies in other hot-button areas—including 
gun control, abortion, and global warming—which may provide theoretical support, see 
generally id. and CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCHOOL, 
http://www.culturalcognition.net/ [https://perma.cc/75AS-NUE2] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018). 
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Unpacking immigration blame is an important starting point for 
understanding the myriad ways that blame permeates the immigration 
system.  But of more consequence is how these blame dynamics operate in 
tandem, churning the politics, policies, and structures of immigration law. 
As theorized here, institutional blame is often linked to migrant blame.  All 
else equal, as dominant perceptions of migrant blame increase, so too does 
the risk of institutional blame for taking favorable action toward the migrants 
at issue.  That correlation, in turn, triggers other dynamics.  Among them, 
migrants have pragmatic incentives to avoid blame.  Often, that blame 
avoidance will implicate other migrants, public officials, and 
nongovernmental actors (such as policy entrepreneurs and media 
personalities).  In addition, migrant blame avoidance often involves pinning 
blame on structural or situational causes (such as dysfunctional or immoral 
immigration controls, conditions in the home or host country, and so on).  
Meanwhile, public officials have their own incentives to manage their risk of 
institutional blame, and do so through a range of presentational, agency, and 
policy strategies.305 
As a purely descriptive matter, these iterative dynamics have catalyzing 
effects on the operation and design choices of the U.S. immigration system. 
 
 305. See supra Part III. 
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 Blaming lawful migrants for 
stealing jobs 
 Blaming undocumented 
migrants for “cutting the 
line”  
 Narratives and metaphors 
depicting migrants at odds 
with American culture and 
values 
 Blaming the Executive for 
unilateral immigration 
policies  
 Blaming state officials for 
cooperating, or for not 
cooperating, with federal 
officials 
 Blaming agency officials 
for how they exercise 
delegated and discretionary 
enforcement power
  B
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  Statistical reports showing 
how migrants boost the 
economy 
 Excuses and justifications 
for amnesty 
 Narratives about 
hardworking, family-centric 
migrants 
 
 Deflecting institutional 
blame by blaming other 
public officials 
 Delegating authority to 
federal, state, and local 
officials  
 Designing policies to 
appease key constituents, 
principals, or peers 
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B.  Law as Input and Output 
Before proceeding to the case studies, it is worth emphasizing that 
immigration blame entails more than rhetoric and political posturing.  The 
law, too, is implicated in various ways. 
First, as input, the law informs perceptions relating to avoidable harm and 
responsibility, which are the key ingredients of blame attribution.  As earlier 
noted, a legal violation or its effects may be deemed a blameworthy harm; 
meanwhile, legal structures may rule in (or rule out) the responsible agents.  
It must also be appreciated that a legal violation is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for blame to attach.  On the one hand, a legal violation is not 
necessary because lawful action may nevertheless be deemed morally, 
socially, or politically blameworthy.  Thus, for example, lawful migrants are 
often blamed for not “assimilating,” while law-abiding legislators are blamed 
for bad immigration policies.  On the other hand, a legal violation may not 
be sufficient for blame to attach because different laws carry different moral, 
social, and political significance.   
For instance, it is one thing for a migrant to unlawfully enter the country, 
which some people may tolerate or justify.  Yet it is quite another if that 
migrant commits a violent crime while unlawfully present, which most 
people do not condone.  Likewise, it is one thing for a public official to 
violate a procedural technicality.  Yet it is another thing when officials flout 
clear constitutional mandates.  Depending on one’s perspective and the 
circumstances of the legal violation, blame might attach in all of these 
examples, or it might not attach in any of them.  That is because legal 
violations may sometimes be excused or justified on moral or political 
grounds, even if not on purely legalistic grounds.306  Thus, although a legal 
violation is often considered a sufficient harm for purposes of attributing 
blame, other considerations and normative predispositions may alter the 
calculus. 
As output, the law is a byproduct of agency and policy blame-avoidance 
strategies.  More specifically, the iterative dynamics of attributing and 
avoiding blame can manifest in the creation, maintenance, or dismantling of 
institutional structures and policies.307  Consider, for example, strategic 
delegations of authority and partnership arrangement.  By their very design, 
the structures of decisional authority will be affected.  Similarly, policies may 
be pursued to avoid blame, in ways that affect legal rights and obligations of 
migrants and public officials. 
Importantly, the legal inputs and outputs of immigration blame often 
relate.  For instance, as input, the law may assign which public officials bear 
 
 306. The public controversies orbiting President Obama’s and President Trump’s signature 
immigration programs are prime examples of how perceptions of law feed perceptions of 
political harm and responsibility. See infra Part IV.C.2.  See generally David S. Rubenstein, 
Taking Care of the Rule of Law, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 168 (2018) (canvassing the legal and 
political debates over Obama’s and Trump’s respective immigration initiatives). 
 307. See supra Parts III.B–C (offering examples); infra Part IV.C (offering additional 
examples). 
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legal responsibility for causing or fixing a perceived problem with the 
immigration system.  In turn, the legal question of who decides often affects 
the output of what is decided.  Owing to different constituencies and 
accountabilities, Congress may decide matters differently than the president 
or courts, which may decide differently than agency heads or frontline 
enforcement agents, which may decide differently than states or cities, and 
so on.308 
C.  Case Studies 
To further develop and illustrate these points, the discussion below delves 
more deeply into the subjects of (1) amnesty; (2) executive enforcement 
policies under the Obama and Trump administrations; (3) the plenary power 
doctrine and its application to Trump’s travel ban; and (4) immigration 
federalism.309 
1.  Amnesty 
The dominant anti-amnesty narrative characterizes undocumented 
migrants as blameworthy lawbreakers, whose cheating of the system should 
neither be rewarded nor countenanced.310  For reasons already explained, 
these characterizations are contestable on the merits.  Here, however, my 
focus is on the relationship between migrant blame and institutional blame.  
The more that undocumented migrants are depicted and perceived as 
blameworthy, the more institutional blame legislators will face for granting 
amnesty. 
The ongoing saga over DREAM Act proposals is revealing in this and 
related respects.  Since at least 2001, the so-called Dreamers have received 
special legislative consideration for amnesty.311  In large measure, that is 
because most Dreamers have compelling excuses:  their parents brought them 
here as children, and this is the only life they know.  If any subpopulation of 
undocumented migrants deserve a chance at amnesty, the Dreamers arguably 
top the list.312  Even if Dreamers are not completely blameless, the innocence 
 
 308. See generally David S. Rubenstein, Black-Box Immigration Federalism, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. 983 (2016) (studying the relationship between who decides, and what is decided, in the 
immigration federalism context).  Local jurisdictions may decide questions of crime-based 
deportation differently than the centralized federal government. See Daniel I. Morales, 
Transforming Crime-Based Deportation, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 745–64 (2017) (explaining 
why and how such decisions are made, and arguing for decentralization on normative 
grounds).   
 309. “Immigration federalism” refers to state and local regulations and their relationship to 
federal controls.  Included in this domain are sanctuary cities, as well as other cooperative and 
uncooperative subfederal initiatives. Rubenstein, supra note 308, at 984 (discussing a range 
of federalism issues implicated by the recent uptick in state and local immigration initiatives). 
 310. Bosniak, supra note 252, at 26–27. 
 311. See supra note 258 and accompanying text; see also Tal Kopan, Lawmakers Compete 
to Carry President’s Mantle on DACA as Talks Continue, CNN (Jan. 11, 2018), 
http://www.cnn.com/2018/01/10/politics/daca-latest-talks/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
75UM-YHHN]. 
 312. Cf. Balara, supra note 268. 
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narrative depicts them as less blameworthy than other undocumented 
migrants (including, somewhat problematically, their parents).313 
The DREAM Act saga also helps to make another, finer, point.  If 
Dreamers are ostensibly “blameless,” then why have they not yet received 
amnesty?  Surely, politics and a cumbersome legislative process are parts of 
the answer.314  But another part is found at the intersection of negativity bias 
and blame.315  To be “blameworthy” implies a negative departure from 
behavioral norms.  To be “blameless,” however, is generally neutral—it is 
simply the absence of blame.  That being so, the innocence narrative has its 
limits.  It puts Dreamers in their own category for legislative 
consideration.316  Still, more is needed for legislative grace under current 
sociopolitical conditions.  A positive narrative—something that makes 
Dreamers praiseworthy, or otherwise beneficial to America’s welfare—is a 
push in the right direction.  But therein lies the rub.  Narratives depicting 
Dreamers as hardworking and beneficial to the country can also be said for a 
much larger pool of amnesty seekers.317  Yet, coming full circle, as the pool 
of amnesty beneficiaries expands to include more “blameworthy” migrants 
(e.g., the “lawbreakers” and “cheaters”),318 the risk of institutional blame for 
granting amnesty increases too. 
Emphatically, this blame-centric gloss is not an alternative to political or 
structural explanations for why the DREAM Act has languished in Congress 
 
 313. See Fanny Lauby, Leaving the ‘Perfect DREAMer’ Behind? Narratives and 
Mobilization in Immigration Reform, 15 SOC. MOVEMENT STUD. 374, 375 (2016) (arguing that 
“the use of the ‘perfect DREAMer’ narrative has led to the marginalization of other 
undocumented migrants who have been implicitly constructed as less deserving because of 
their age or level of education”). 
 314. See, e.g., Yamiche Alcindor & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, After 16 Futile Years, Congress 
Will Try Again to Legalize ‘Dreamers,’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2017/09/05/us/politics/dream-act-daca-trump-congress-dreamers.html [https://perma.cc/3X 
4F-D25R] (discussing sixteen years of failed efforts to pass the DREAM Act); Rachel Weiner, 
How Immigration Reform Failed, Over and Over, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/01/30/how-immigration-reform-
failed-over-and-over/ [https://perma.cc/8L94-2YAC]; see also William M. Eskridge, Jr., 
Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1444–48 (2008) (describing 
a range of “vetogates” in the legislative process that stifle a bill’s passage into law). 
 315. See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text (discussing negativity bias). 
 316. See Richard V. Rodriguez & Gidget Benitez, Congress Must Move Forward with the 
Bridge Act to Prevent Deportation of DREAMers, HUFFINGTON POST (May 11, 2017), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/congress-must-move-forward-with-the-bridge-act-to-
prevent-deportation-of-dreamers_us_59147e39e4b066b42171d9d0 [https://perma.cc/5G6G-
9MCA]; see also supra notes 258, 261, 314 (discussing and citing DREAM Act proposals in 
Congress). 
 317. Cf. Lauby, supra note 313, at 374–75, 380–81; Benjamin Harris, Why Your Economic 
Argument Against Immigration Is Probably Wrong, FORTUNE (Sept. 11, 2017), 
http://fortune.com/2017/09/11/daca-immigration-economy-donald-trump/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2DNB-J6ZL]; Rodriguez & Benitez, supra note 316. 
 318. Cf. Press Release, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Collateral Damage:  President’s 
Unilateral Actions Punish Legal Immigrants (Dec. 4, 2014), http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
index.cfm/press-releases?id=21782655-651B-44F9-8230-FBAA001EA0C5 [http://perma.cc/ 
UJB8-KQC6]. 
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for nearly two decades.319  Rather, my suggestion is that blame dynamics 
offer a new way to understand the political results. 
Also worth emphasizing here is that one legislator’s risk of institutional 
blame may be another legislator’s opportunity for political credit.  Thus, an 
amnesty program might attract institutional blame for one legislator and 
garner praise for a different legislator.  Meanwhile, funding a border wall 
might carry inverse political risk and credit for these lawmakers.  
Aggregating the two policies together thus can have offsetting effects, which 
potentially makes a deal possible.  Again, however, this is where negativity 
bias can be cognitively and politically distorting.  First, as voters, our own 
negativity bias may cause us to feel more displeasure with what is given up 
in a deal than satisfaction with what is gained.320  Moreover, a legislator may 
assume that constituent perceptions are skewed by negativity bias, even if 
they are not.  Thus, if a legislator thinks that key constituents are more likely 
to vote out of displeasure than pleasure,321 the legislator may be skewed 
toward blame-avoiding rather than credit-claiming policies and packages. 
2.  Executive Immigration Enforcement (and Nonenforcement) 
The still-unfolding DACA saga offers another iteration of these themes but 
captures some additional dynamics worth elaborating on.  Whereas amnesty 
is an issue for Congress to decide (subject to the president’s veto),322 DACA 
involves the Executive in a significantly different way.  More specifically, 
DACA raises questions about the Executive’s power to categorically defer 
enforcement of Congress’s laws that are already on the books.323  When the 
political branches are at loggerheads, the cat-and-mouse dynamics of 
immigration blame take new twists. 
As earlier noted, President Obama and his top officials repeatedly 
renounced authority to unilaterally grant relief to undocumented migrants 
during his first presidential term.324  From the start, however, Obama was 
caught in a political pickle.  Legal authority or not, Obama’s political base 
routinely blamed him for not protecting the Dreamers and, more generally, 
 
 319. See supra note 314 and accompanying text. 
 320. Again, what qualifies as “gains” and “losses” in this context depends on what the 
reference point is, and how it and the deal around it is rhetorically framed. See supra notes 
222–27 and accompanying text (discussing framing effects). 
 321. See Weaver, supra note 13, at 373–77 (modeling this voting behavior around 
negativity bias). 
 322. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (requiring congressional bills be presented to the president for 
veto). 
 323. Between 2012 and 2017, approximately 800,000 individuals were granted DACA 
benefits. See Number of I-821D, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, by 
Fiscal Year, Quarter, Intake, Biometrics and Case Status:  Fiscal Year 2012–2017, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. 1 (June 30, 2017), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/ 
USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20For
m%20Types/DACA/daca_performancedata_fy2017_qtr3.pdf [https://perma.cc/9J6E-TCUH] 
[hereinafter Number of I-821D]. 
 324. See supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
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for not fulfilling his campaign pledge of comprehensive immigration 
reform.325 
During his second term, President Obama proclaimed that he would no 
longer “wait for an increasingly dysfunctional Congress,” which was not 
doing its job.326  In June 2012, that ambition sprang to life with the DACA 
program.327  DACA provides “deferred action” and employment eligibility 
to undocumented migrants who were brought to the country as children.328  
Deferred action is a type of limbo status; it suspends unlawful presence but 
does not confer lawful status.329  In 2012, the number of eligible DACA 
beneficiaries was estimated to fall between one and two million.330 
The White House knew that DACA would be a blame-avoiding policy vis-
à-vis its Democratic base.  But wider popular support was contingent on the 
efficacy of supporting presentational tactics.  Toward that end, President 
Obama stressed the innocence of the Dreamer population.331  Moreover, he 
argued that DACA was the right thing to do not only for these youths but also 
for the country, which would benefit economically and otherwise from their 
social integration.332  Beyond these justifications, President Obama’s “We 
Can’t Wait” slogan implied that someone had to act and, because Congress 
was not doing its job, the Executive should pick up the mantle.333 
Putting aside whether DACA was justified on the merits, President 
Obama’s decision to blame Congress was entirely strategic.  Needless to say, 
members of Congress did not want to be blamed either.  And they, too, had 
excuses and justifications:  the country was deeply divided over immigration 
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15 (2015). 
 330. Fact Sheet:  Who and Where the DREAMers Are, Revised Estimates, AM. IMMIGR. 
COUNCIL (Oct. 16, 2012), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/who-and-
where-dreamers-are-revised-estimates [https://perma.cc/BJ2G-NEG7]. 
 331. See, e.g., Barack Obama, A Nation of Laws and a Nation of Immigrants, TIME (June 
17, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/06/17/a-nation-of-laws-and-a-nation-of-immigrants/ 
[https://perma.cc/FZH2-6ZLX] (writing in support of DACA). 
 332. See id. 
 333. Cf. David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 43–44 
(2014) (describing Obama’s initiative as a self-help measure, and normatively defending the 
practice).  But cf. David S. Rubenstein, Self-Help Structuralism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1619, 1650–
59 (2015) (extending Pozen’s ideas to include federalism, and critiquing constitutional self-
help on normative grounds). 
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reform, including with respect to the Dreamers.334  Congressional inaction 
was thus arguably quite consistent with their legislative role.  Further, some 
members of Congress sought to reverse the blame coming from the White 
House.  According to congressional conservatives, President Obama was not 
doing his constitutional job of “tak[ing] Care” to “faithfully execute” 
Congress’s laws.335 
Comparing DACA to the Obama administration’s subsequent deferred-
action program, DAPA, further showcases the connections between migrant 
blame and institutional blame.336  Under DAPA, undocumented parents of 
U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents would be eligible for deferred 
action if certain requirements were met.337  Like DACA, DAPA beneficiaries 
would be considered lawfully present in the United States for renewable 
periods and eligible for work authorization.338  An estimated four million 
undocumented migrants might have qualified for DAPA (had it not been 
judicially enjoined).339 
Obama’s presentational blame-avoidance tactics were on full display when 
he announced DAPA during a primetime, nationally broadcast speech from 
the White House.340  To justify DAPA (and DACA) on policy grounds, 
Obama offered this to the viewing public: 
Even as we are a nation of immigrants, we’re also a nation of laws.  
Undocumented workers broke our immigration laws, and I believe they 
must be held accountable—especially those who may be dangerous.  That’s 
why, over the past six years, deportations of criminals are up 80 percent.  
And that’s why we’re going to keep focusing enforcement resources on 
actual threats to our security.  Felons, not families.  Criminals, not children.  
Gang members, not a mom who’s working hard to provide for her kids.  
We’ll prioritize, just like law enforcement does every day.341 
 
 334. See supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
 335. See U.S. CONST. art. II; see also Unconstitutionality of Obama’s Executive Actions on 
Immigration:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 5–6 (2015) 
(statement of Rep. Trey Gowdy, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“If this President’s 
unilateral extraconstitutional acts are not stopped, future Presidents, you may rest assured, will 
expand that power of the executive branch, thereby threatening the constitutional 
equilibrium.”). 
 336. See generally DAPA Memo, supra note 225. 
 337. See id. at 4. 
 338. Id. at 2–4. 
 339. See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per curiam) (affirming, 
without opinion, the Fifth Circuit’s preliminary injunction of DAPA in Texas v. United States, 
805 F.3d 653, 657 (5th Cir. 2015)); Press Release, Migration Policy Inst., As Many as 3.7 
Million Unauthorized Immigrants Could Get Relief from Deportation Under Anticipated New 
Deferred Action Program (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/mpi-many-
37-million-unauthorized-immigrants-could-get-relief-deportation-under-anticipated-new 
[https://perma.cc/52LC-6RYL]. 
 340. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President in Address to the 
Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration [https://perma.cc/8JLL-
4QT6]. 
 341. Id. 
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In this short snippet, notice how much is happening through a 
presentational lens.  The mention of criminals and gang members changes 
the reference point, thus positioning the hardworking mom in a more 
favorable light.  At the same time, by stressing the Obama administration’s 
hawkish deportation policies against more blameworthy migrants, the White 
House hoped to offset institutional blame for DAPA.  His analogy to 
everyday law enforcement was in the same blame-avoiding spirit (although 
it was a stretch).342 
Through a blame lens, the timing of Obama’s announcements of DACA 
and DAPA is also telling.  The former was announced in the summer of 2012, 
a few months prior to Obama’s bid for reelection.  This was no coincidence.  
Whether to gain credit or avoid blame, the White House’s political calculus 
was that DACA would improve President Obama’s electoral prospects.343  
By contrast, DAPA was announced immediately after the 2014 midterm 
elections.344  This was no coincidence either.  The political calculus for 
DAPA was that the backlash from Republican voters could hurt the electoral 
prospects of Democratic candidates who were competing for congressional 
seats.345  By waiting to announce DAPA until after the midterm elections, 
the White House could avoid being blamed by Democrats for jeopardizing 
their chances. 
But why was that the political calculus for DAPA?  Substantively, DACA 
and DAPA were near equivalents.  True, DAPA covered many more people.  
But if DACA was perceived as a credit-gaining program, then why would a 
bigger program not gain even more institutional credit?  The missing link, I 
suggest, is blame.  Generally speaking, public perceptions of migrant blame 
surrounding adult undocumented migrants was greater than for the Dreamer 
population.  That being so, the risk of institutional blame for granting legal 
reprieve to the adult population was greater too. 
 
 342. Obama’s analogy to everyday law enforcement elides the scope of DAPA. See 
generally DAPA Memo, supra note 225.  If implemented, the program would have offered 
millions of undocumented migrants the opportunity to legally work in the country and be 
eligible for certain social-security benefits (which arguably is not the stuff of everyday law 
enforcement). See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 21–31, Texas v. United 
States, No. 1:18-cv-00068 (S.D. Tex. May 2, 2018) (discussing the downstream legal 
implications of DAPA and DACA, beyond mere nonenforcement). 
 343. See Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers:  Enforcement Discretion in the Absence 
of Immigration Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 255, 261 (2013). 
 344. See, e.g., Jennifer Epstein, ‘Come Out of the Shadows’:  Obama, At Last, Unveils 
Sweeping Action on Immigration, POLITICO (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.politico.com/ 
story/2014/11/obama-immigration-action-113072 [https://perma.cc/8LBA-6KWS] (“The 
president’s moves reflect a second-term White House that is fed up with congressional 
dysfunction and that, with the midterm elections behind them, no longer has to worry about 
the immediate political fallout for Democrats on the ballot.”). 
 345. See Julie Pace, Why It Took 6 Years for Obama to Act on Immigration, PBS (Nov. 21, 
2014), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/heres-why-it-took-6-years-for-obama-to-act-
on-immigration [https://perma.cc/F7WP-VMBJ] (“The move came in response to requests 
from nervous Democrats who feared the controversial actions could upend their chances of 
keeping control of the Senate.”). 
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Now, under the Trump administration, some of these dynamics are 
unfolding in reverse.  Although his administration’s repeal of DAPA was met 
with public criticism,346 it paled in comparison to the intensity of institutional 
blame sparked by Trump’s subsequent decision to repeal DACA.347  One 
reason for this asymmetry, I have already suggested, is the compelling force 
of the innocence narrative in public discourse.  But Trump’s reversal of 
Obama’s signature deferred-action programs presents an opportunity to tease 
out and connect some additional points. 
First, ending DAPA was not widely felt as a “loss” because it never went 
into effect.348  By contrast, DACA did go into effect and was granted to 
approximately 800,000 Dreamers.349  Thus, from the vantage of DACA 
recipients (and their allies), the prospect of ending the program was perceived 
and weighted quite differently.  This is a framing effect.350  Owing to 
negativity bias (and loss aversion), the psychological impulse to avoid 
DACA’s loss is greater than if the program had never been implemented in 
the first place. 
Second, and relatedly, the innocence narrative resonates differently in this 
context than it does in the amnesty context.351  The absence of blame may 
not be a strong prompt for favorable government action.  Yet, at the very 
least, being blameless is arguably a reason for neutral government action.  
Framed as a “loss,”352 DACA’s repeal will strike many observers as 
unfavorable government action toward blameless migrants.  This is a recipe 
for institutional blame.  Moreover, in the enforcement setting, the loss is 
compounded by an additional framing effect:  there are millions of more 
 
 346. See Memorandum from John F. Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin 
K. McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (June 15, 2017), 
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 347. See Memorandum from Elaine Duke, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to 
James W. McCament, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al. 
(Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca 
[https://perma.cc/2YL3-NSG7] [hereinafter Memo from Elaine Duke]; Jennifer Rubin, 
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2017/09/04/trump-ending-daca-
would-be-cruelty-wrapped-in-a-web-of-lies/ [https://perma.cc/29WT-FVYF]; Michael D. 
Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to End DACA and Calls on Congress to Act, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/us/politics/trump-daca-
dreamers-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/6MCA-E6AL]; Derek Thompson, The 
Economic Senselessness of President Trump’s DACA Repeal, ATLANTIC (Sept. 5, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/09/trump-daca-repeal/538911/ 
[https://perma.cc/C37R-38FK]. 
 348. See supra notes 339, 346 and accompanying text. 
 349. See Number of I-821D, supra note 323, at 1. 
 350. Trump’s repeals of DAPA and DACA can both be framed as losses; they can also be 
framed as a return to the pre-2012 status quo.  Yet, as between these alternative framings, it 
seems most natural to frame the repeal of DACA as a “loss” and the repeal of DAPA as more 
neutral. 
 351. See supra Part IV.C.1. 
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blameworthy migrants at-large to expend limited government resources on.  
Put otherwise, spending resources to deport DACA-eligible migrants seems 
irrational, if not also unfair, when the migrant blame lens is expanded. 
Thus, as might be expected, Trump’s blame-avoiding approach with 
respect to DACA was replete with presentational and policy tactics.  In one 
tweeted breath, Trump first announced DACA’s suspension and redirected 
would-be blamers to Congress:  “Congress, get ready to do your job—
DACA!”353  A few hours later, Trump responded to a firestorm of public 
protest with a second tweet:  “Congress now has 6 months to legalize DACA 
(something the Obama Administration was unable to do).  If they can’t, I will 
revisit this issue!”354  Put otherwise, Trump’s message to America was:  
blame Congress, blame Obama, but do not blame Trump—at least not yet.355 
Further, the choice to provide a six-month phase-out period for DACA, 
rather than terminate the program outright, was likely an attempt to minimize 
blame.356  The very anticipation of being blamed, it seems, had some effect 
on the politics and policies surrounding DACA’s suspension. 
For another illustration, return to the family-separation crisis still 
unfolding under the Trump administration.  As earlier noted, more than two 
thousand migrant children were separated from parents who were 
apprehended at or near the border in 2018.357  Although family separations 
occurred under prior administrations,358 the practice ballooned in scope 
under the Trump administration and drew far greater public attention and 
scorn.359  As pressure mounted, the Trump administration denied 
responsibility for family separation and tried to pin it elsewhere.360 
More specifically, per the Trump administration, the proper targets of 
blame were:  (1) the Democrats, who passed the “horrible” laws requiring 
 
 353. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 5, 2017, 5:04 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/905038986883850240 [https://perma.cc/CDQ3-
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 354. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 5, 2017, 5:38 PM), 
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 355. As of this writing, lower courts to address the issue have enjoined the Trump 
administration’s repeal of DACA, on the ground that the repeal was “arbitrary and capricious” 
under the Administrative Procedure Act. See generally, e.g., NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 
3d 457 (D.D.C. 2018); New York v. Trump, No. 16-CV-4756, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23547 
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 358. See Brian Sonenstein, Separation of Immigrant Families Was Part of Deportation 
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 359. See Rucker et al., supra note 274. 
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CNN (June 18, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/18/politics/immigration-white-house-
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family separation and who were obstructing legislative fixes;361 (2) the 
judiciary, which had previously prohibited the detention of migrant children 
with their parents;362 and (3) undocumented parents, who not only entered 
the country illegally, but also exposed their children to life-threatening 
dangers.363 
For a variety of reasons, the Trump administration’s attempts to divert 
institutional blame were unsuccessful.364  To begin, the Trump 
administration’s account of institutional responsibility was not credible.365  
Family separation is the result of a conflation of laws and policies, but they 
are not Democratic laws and policies.  One of the key laws, the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA), requires that 
unaccompanied migrant children be placed in the custody of the Department 
of Health and Human Services.366  TVPRA was passed by a unanimous 
Congress and signed into law by Republican President George W. Bush.367 
Moreover, the judicial orders and decrees at issue—commonly referred to 
as the “Flores Agreement”—limit the federal government’s ability to detain 
migrant children.368  But the Flores Agreement does not require that parents 
be criminally prosecuted, much less incarcerated, when they are 
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accompanied by their children at the border.369  Rather, the decisions to 
prosecute parents and incarcerate them were operational features of the 
Trump administration’s “zero-tolerance” policy, which took effect in the 
spring of 2018.370 
Properly understood, family separation resulted from a mix of causal 
factors:  the TVPRA, the Flores Agreement, the arriving parents’ unlawful 
entry, and the Trump administration’s zero-tolerance policy.371  Despite the 
legal nuances, it was clear enough to the general public that the Trump 
administration was at least partly responsible for the family-separation 
crisis.372  And, whatever the merits of the zero-tolerance policy, the Trump 
administration clearly had (and still has) the discretionary authority to undo 
it.  Upon these realizations, the White House’s incredulous attempt to deflect 
blame became a blameworthy act itself.373 
What ultimately tipped the scales, however, were the unrelenting stories, 
sounds, and images of suffering children.374  The Trump administration tried 
its hand at publicizing more positive images of children playing video games, 
attending classes, and living contently.375  Yet, unsurprisingly, the heart-
wrenching accounts of crying children dominated public perceptions, 
including among many Republicans.376  As one journalist reported:  “No 
matter how much [Trump’s] base loves his tough-guy act on the border, the 
sounds of little children crying for their parents was winning out.”377  This is 
negativity bias at work.378 
It is hard to overstate the impact these images and sounds had on 
America’s collective psyche.  Suffice to say, it was enough to cause the White 
House to relent, at least in part.  Under intense bipartisan pressure, Trump 
signed an executive order prospectively halting family separation.379  
Instead, the executive order called for family detention, whereby parents and 
children would be detained together “to the extent permitted by law and 
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 379. See Exec. Order No. 13,841, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,435 (June 20, 2018). 
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subject to the availability of appropriations.”380  The title of the executive 
order—“Affording Congress an Opportunity to Address Family 
Separation”—was a less-than-subtle attempt to redirect blame to 
Congress.381 
A section of the executive order also called upon the Attorney General to 
seek a judicial modification of the Flores Agreement to allow family 
detention.382  As of this writing, litigation over the Flores Agreement is still 
pending.383  In the opening scene, however, federal Judge Dolly Gee flatly 
ruled against the government’s request.384  Her closing dicta was striking, 
and of special interest here.385  Loath to accept blame, Judge Gee lodged 
institutional responsibility with Congress (for its “inaction”) and the 
executive branch (for its “ill-considered” action).386  “Regardless,” Judge 
Gee wrote, “what is certain is that the children . . . are blameless.”387  A 
favorable judicial ruling for the government could make the court complicit, 
and a target of blame, for their detention.  Judge Gee understandably wanted 
no piece of that. 
Although it is too soon to say how the episodes discussed above will play 
out, the dynamics of immigration blame have already left their mark on the 
politics and policies under consideration. 
3.  The Plenary Power Doctrine (and the Travel Ban) 
The literature on the Supreme Court’s plenary power doctrine is legion but 
has never been studied through the prism of blame.388  This Article suggests 
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that the plenary power doctrine both shapes, and is shaped by, the dynamics 
of immigration blame.389  To the extent that judges are politically insulated, 
they may have less reason to avoid blame.390  But judges do have instincts 
and incentives to avoid blame, whether for psychological, reputational, or 
institutional reasons.391  Judge Gee’s remarks in the Flores litigation are a 
stark example of judicial blame avoidance, egged on by the Trump 
administration’s blaming of the court.392  Far from idiosyncratic, her instincts 
are entirely natural.  Indeed, if judicial legitimacy depends on public support, 
then judges arguably should avoid blame in appropriate ways and 
situations.393 
Through these optics, the Supreme Court’s plenary power doctrine may be 
understood as a self-preserving blame-avoidance strategy.  The message 
splayed across this anachronistic line of cases is unmistakable:  aggrieved 
parties should take their complaints to the federal political branches.394  Time 
and again, the Court has invoked the plenary power doctrine to uphold federal 
immigration laws that would be inconceivable in other regulatory 
 
See also supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text (summarizing the contours of the plenary 
power doctrine). 
 389. See supra Part I.B (explaining how the doctrine can potentially rule in, and rule out, 
which public officials to blame for perceived harms in the immigration system); infra Part 
IV.C.3 (discussing how the plenary power doctrine may be viewed as a form of judicial blame 
avoidance); infra Part V.D (discussing how revisions to the plenary power doctrine might limit 
the political branches’ range of policy strategies for avoiding blame). 
 390. Weaver, supra note 13, at 376–77 (noting that while judges “might not like to be 
blamed for unpopular decisions, they can withstand blame better than legislators and elective 
and appointed officials in the executive branch”). 
 391. That judges are fallible and emotional humans combines the jurisprudential insights 
of the Legal Realists, see, for example, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 167–77 (1921) (asserting the relevance of the subconscious mind to judicial decision-
making), and the more recent psychological insights discussed in Part II of this Article.  That 
judges may be responsive to blame, and seek to avoid it, also coheres with Professor Barry 
Friedman’s argument that the Supreme Court’s decisions in the modern era are influenced by 
public opinion. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 14 (2009).  Friedman argues that 
the Court acts not just out of a fear that its decisions will be unpopular, but that its decisions 
will not be put into action. But see Sanford Levinson, Courts as Participants in “Dialogue”:  
A View from American States, 59 KAN. L. REV. 791, 795–96 (2011) (critiquing the connections 
that Friedman draws between popular opinion and judicial outcomes). 
 392. See supra note 384 and accompanying text. 
 393. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (“[T]o overrule 
[Roe v. Wade] under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a 
watershed decision would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious question.”); 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS 29–32 (2d ed. 1986).  It is beyond this Article’s scope to specify when, and how, 
it might be appropriate for judges to avoid blame.  I do, however, offer some generalized 
prescriptions in Part V that could serve as a starting point. See infra Part V.C (calling for and 
outlining an “ethics of immigration blame”). 
 394. The original dictum comes from the foundational Chinese Exclusion Case:  “If the 
government of the country of which the foreigners excluded are subjects is dissatisfied with 
this action it can make complaint to the executive head of our government . . . .” 130 U.S. 581, 
606 (1889). 
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contexts.395  Still, citing principles of stare decisis, the Court effectively 
punts.396 
In Galvan v. Press,397 for example, the Court explained that if it “we[re] 
writing on a clean slate,” then perhaps the Due Process Clause would protect 
the petitioner from the harsh deportation law at issue.398  Yet, the Court 
stressed, “[T]he slate is not clean. . . .  [T]here is not merely ‘a page of 
history,’ but a whole volume.”399  The doctrinal slate is more marked today.  
As earlier discussed, the Court in Trump v. Hawaii stressed that federal 
immigration policy has been “largely immune” from constitutional review 
“[f]or more than a century.”400 
One might view these paeans to stare decisis as judicial minimalism.  One 
might also, however, view the Court’s appeals to stare decisis as a form of 
blame avoidance:  the judicial analog to a political official’s excuse that their 
hands are tied.401  From reams of scholarly work, the Court already has ample 
fodder to scrap the plenary power doctrine on the merits.402  Perhaps if the 
doctrine attracts significantly more blame than it deflects, and if the Court 
cares about such things (for the sake of its own legitimacy or otherwise), then 
the impulse to avoid blame may tip the scales toward a normalized 
immigration jurisprudence.403 
Despite its potential, Trump v. Hawaii was not that case.  To begin with, 
the Court had no blame-free options:  it would be widely blamed (by some) 
for allowing Trump’s Proclamation to survive and widely blamed (by others) 
for striking it down.  From an institutional vantage, what was the least-worst 
option for the Court?  On the one hand, allowing the Proclamation to survive 
exposes the Court to a certain type and intensity of blame.  Justice 
Sotomayor’s strongly worded dissent in Trump v. Hawaii, for example, 
blames the Court’s majority for “ignoring the facts, misconstruing our legal 
precedent, and turning a blind eye to the pain and suffering the Proclamation 
 
 395. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976). 
 396. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 n.4 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 
753, 766–67 (1972); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952). 
 397. 347 U.S. 522 (1954). 
 398. Id. at 530–31 (upholding deportation on the basis of Communist Party membership). 
 399. Id. (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)). 
 400. No. 17-965, slip op. at 30 (U.S. June 26, 2018) (quoting Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792). 
 401. Cf. id. at 32 n.5 (“The dissent criticizes application of a more constrained standard of 
review as ‘throw[ing] the Establishment Clause out the window.’  But as the numerous 
precedents cited in this section make clear, such a circumscribed inquiry applies to any 
constitutional claim concerning the entry of foreign nationals.” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion)). 
 402. In a nutshell, the plenary power doctrine has been attacked as both legally and morally 
unjustified.  For some of the early leading work, see, for example, STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, 
IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY:  LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 177–222 
(1987).  For a collection and summary of decades of academic critique, see Rubenstein & 
Gulasekaram, supra note 19, at 615–18. 
 403. I will revisit this possibility in Part V, with some observations and suggestions for 
how tweaking the plenary power doctrine might counter some pathologies of blame avoidance. 
See infra Part V.D. 
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inflicts upon countless families and individuals, many of whom are United 
States citizens.”404 
On the other hand, however, imagine a counterfactual scenario in which 
the Court enjoined the Proclamation and a terrorist attack occurs on 
American soil within the next few years.  According to many national-
security experts, the likelihood that the Proclamation can prevent an attack is 
extremely low.405  Still, in the hypothetical event of attack, it is almost certain 
that the Court would be intensely (if not ruinously) blamed by large swaths 
of the U.S. population.  Owing to cognitive biases, people are highly prone 
to blame decision makers for good decisions that turn out badly in 
hindsight.406  When in doubt, maintaining the status quo is not only 
consistent with the principle of stare decisis, it also generally attracts less 
blame if things later go wrong.407 
Indeed, anticipating a Supreme Court showdown, President Trump primed 
this pump.  Soon after his first travel ban was enjoined in federal district 
court, President Trump took to Twitter:  “Just cannot believe a judge would 
put our country in such peril.  If something happens blame him and court 
system.  People pouring in.  Bad!”408 
It is hard to know whether and how much the risk of institutional blame 
factored into the Court’s decisional calculus in Trump v. Hawaii or in other 
immigration cases.  Nothing in my account here depends on it.  As a purely 
descriptive matter, and regardless of the Court’s motivations, the plenary 
power doctrine provides the Court with some institutional cover—and has 
“[f]or more than a century.”409  Staying the course is not a blame-free path 
for the Court.410  For better or worse, however, the plenary power doctrine 
hedges against the risk of other types and intensities of blame that might 
follow if the Court were to assign itself a greater role in matters of federal 
immigration and national security. 
4.  Immigration Federalism 
If state and local officials were precluded from passing immigration-
related laws, then they might plausibly deny responsibility for perceived 
 
 404. Trump, slip op. at 1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 405. Id. at 21–22 (“[S]everal former national-security officials from both political 
parties . . . have advised that the Proclamation and its predecessor orders ‘do not advance the 
national-security or foreign policy interests of the United States, and in fact do serious harm 
to those interests.’”); Nina Totenberg, Why Dozens of National Security Experts Have Come 
Out Against Trump’s Travel Ban, NPR (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.npr.org/ 
2018/04/24/604949251/why-dozens-of-national-security-experts-have-come-out-against-
trumps-travel-ban [https://perma.cc/E3CT-QL43]. 
 406. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 119, at 203–04 (discussing outcome bias and hindsight 
bias). 
 407. Cf. id. 
 408. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 5, 2017, 12:39 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/828342202174668800 [https://perma.cc/64K2-
P3J9]. 
 409. Trump, slip op. at 30. 
 410. See supra notes 402, 404 and accompanying text. 
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immigration-related harms.  As earlier discussed, however, the more the 
federal government devolves immigration authority to state and local 
jurisdictions, and the more these jurisdictions assert authority, the more 
subfederal officials are exposed to institutional blame.411  In turn, the risk of 
institutional blame triggers avoidance strategies by subfederal officials, 
which then shape immigration policies on the ground. 
For example, public officials in states and localities where undocumented 
migration is perceived as harmful are more inclined to pass restrictionist 
policies toward this population (for example, in Arizona and Texas).412  
Meanwhile, states where undocumented migration is not perceived as 
harmful are more inclined to pass laws that seek to integrate and welcome 
these migrants (for example, in California and New York).413 
Even within integrationist jurisdictions, state and local officials must 
manage their risk of institutional blame.  Return to the sanctuary city 
example.  Not all sanctuary policies are the same.  They differ, I suggest, 
because policy lines are drawn with an eye toward managing institutional 
blame.414  Several major sanctuary jurisdictions, for example, make 
distinctions between migrants who commit minor versus major crimes.415  
Through blame spectacles, it is one thing for local law enforcement agencies 
to release minor criminal offenders back into the general population; it is 
quite another to release deportable drug dealers, rapists, and murderers. 
Subfederal officials are keen to these distinctions, and they tailor their 
sanctuary policies accordingly.  Again, I am not suggesting that avoiding 
 
 411. See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. 
 412. See, e.g., City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 885 F.3d 332, 360 (5th Cir. 2018) (upholding a 
Texas statute which forbids sanctuary policies by cities and localities within the state); 
S. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ariz. 2010) (“The legislature declares that the intent of 
this act is to make attrition through enforcement the public policy . . . .  The provisions of this 
act are intended to . . . discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens . . . .”).  
The Supreme Court, in Arizona v. United States, invalidated portions of S.B. 1070, as it was 
popularly known. 567 U.S. 387, 407–10 (2012).  Other sections of the bill survived. See also 
Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 66, at 1463–85 (describing restrictionist state and 
local laws). 
 413. Examples of integrationist measures include sanctuary or noncooperation laws, and 
laws that provide public benefits to unauthorized immigrants, such as in-state college tuition 
or municipal identification cards. See Rodríguez, supra note 116, at 576; Karthick 
Ramakrishnan & Allan Colbern, Opinion, Immigration Reform:  ‘The California Package,’ 
L.A. TIMES (June 24, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0624-ramakrishnan 
-state-citizenship-20150624-story.html [https://perma.cc/LY5U-AV9E] (explaining how 
California has “encourage[ed] integration rather than deportation” through immigration 
policies). 
 414. Cf. Natashia Tidwell, Fragmenting the Community:  Immigration Enforcement and 
the Unintended Consequences of Local Police Non-Cooperation Policies, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 105, 142 (2014) (warning that “[w]hen discretionary policies are shaped by community 
preferences, legitimacy lasts only as long as the next election cycle”). 
 415. See COOK COUNTY, ILL. § 46-37 (2018) (allowing detainer compliance where the 
target of detainer is convicted of a serious or violent felony offense for which he or she is 
currently in custody); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 9-131 (2018) (including 
numerous crime-based exceptions to noncompliance with detainers); see also CAL. GOV’T 
CODE §§ 7282.5(a), 7284.6(a)(4) (West 2018) (same). 
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blame is the only consideration; just that it is an important one that helps to 
explain (and perhaps justify) where sanctuary policy lines are drawn.416 
*          *          * 
Parts I through IV, above, provide a descriptive account of how the 
conflation of migrant blame, institutional blame, blame attribution, and 
blame avoidance, infuse immigration politics, policies, and structures.  
Understanding immigration blame will not resolve differences in opinion 
over how to fix the immigration system, which by all accounts is 
metaphorically “broken.”  Rather, this Article’s descriptive modeling hopes 
to be empowering in at least three ways. 
First, one cannot fully understand our immigration system, as it currently 
exists, without understanding the dynamic pulls and pushes of immigration 
blame.  Sensitivity to these phenomena can enrich our understanding of 
immigration law. 
Second, any who aspire to improve the extant system—whether as 
advocates, public officials, or voters—will need to account for immigration 
blame, both strategically and ideologically.  We are all participants, not just 
victims, of immigration blame.417 
Third, the study of immigration blame can instill new perspectives on 
American values, both past and present.  Which migrants to accept into our 
national and local communities, and how to treat them under the law, are 
reflections of who we are and hope to become as a nation.418  So too are our 
decisions about which public officials to support and what to expect of them 
in office.  The normative and prescriptive implications of immigration blame 
are taken up in Part V below.  But those aspirations cannot be pursued, much 
less realized, without having a steady grip on the mechanics and 
machinations of immigration blame. 
V.  NORMATIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE DIMENSIONS 
If there is no way to harness or leverage immigration blame, then what it 
ought to be is intriguing but inconsequential.  Within legal and pragmatic 
limits, however, there is reason to think—and hope—that we can do better.  
Toward that objective, this Part:  (1) makes the positive case for immigration 
 
 416. The same might be said when viewing these sanctuary policies through an “equity” or 
“proportionality” lens. See generally Cade, supra note 15.  Although Professor Cade’s equity-
proportionality theory is quite different than the immigration blame model developed here, the 
two may overlap in this context.  For example, in the sanctuary context, subfederal officials 
may be blamed for lack of proportionality if their sanctuary policies do not differentiate 
between nonviolent and violent criminal offenders, or blamed for interfering with federal 
determinations about what is equitable and proportionate. 
 417. See infra Part V.C (sketching the outlines of what an “ethics of immigration blame” 
should entail). 
 418. Cf. JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 171 (“Throughout U.S. history, the exclusion and 
deportation provisions of the U.S. immigration laws have acted as a ‘magic mirror’ into the 
domestic prejudices and biases in the nation’s heart and soul.”). 
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blame;419 (2) argues for an “ethics of immigration blame”;420 and 
(3) suggests ways that legal doctrines and structures might help to counter 
some of immigration blame’s nocuous manifestations.421 
A.  Valuing Blame 
When blame dynamics lead to dysfunctional or irrational outcomes, there 
may be reason to blame blame.  Yet when the same dynamics lead to 
outcomes we favor, why not praise blame?  More than ironic, this asymmetry 
is telling:  the same negativity bias that nourishes blame can cause us to 
overlook or devalue blame’s constructive possibilities. 
When done right, blame is essential to a well-functioning immigration 
system.  First, blame is a way to signal disapproval of harmful or wrongful 
behavior by migrants and public officials.422  Indeed, sometimes blame is the 
most appropriate response to violations of social, political, and legal 
norms.423  It would not be fitting, for example, to feel only apathy (much less 
pleasure) in reaction to a public official’s constitutional violation or in 
reaction to a migrant’s violent crime.  To not blame in these and other 
situations could signal complacency, if not condonation of harmful or 
wrongful behavior.424 
Second, and relatedly, blame can serve an important dialogic function.425  
Because blame is a normatively infused judgment of disapproval, it generally 
calls for a response from the blamee.426  Any number of responses are 
possible:  denial of wrongdoing, an excuse, a justification, an apology, a 
promise to act differently next time, and so on.  When the blamee denies the 
accusation of harm or wrongdoing, the blamer may be called upon to defend 
the veracity and fairness of the accusation.427  For example, the excuses and 
justifications proffered by pro-amnesty advocates return pressure on anti-
amnesty politicians and pundits to explain, or at least to consider, why the 
proffered excuses and justifications are unconvincing.  In this example, and 
countless others, the dialogic process of attributing and avoiding blame can 
 
 419. See infra Part V.A–B. 
 420. See infra Part V.C. 
 421. See infra Part V.D. 
 422. See supra Part I (discussing migrant blame and institutional blame); cf. Jay R. 
Wallace, Dispassionate Opprobrium:  On Blame and the Reactive Sentiments, in REASONS 
AND RECOGNITION:  ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF T. M. SCANLON 348, 368 (2011) (noting 
that blame may be “peculiarly appropriate” in a situation, and thus important to have in our 
repertoire of reactions to wrongdoing). 
 423. Macalester Bell, The Standing to Blame:  A Critique, in BLAME:  ITS NATURE AND 
NORMS, supra note 1, at 263, 268 (“Condemning wrongdoing is a central way for persons to 
express their moral commitments and avoid condonation.”). 
 424. Id. 
 425. For parallel views in moral philosophy, which depict blame as a type of dialogical 
exchange, see Victoria McGeer, Civilizing Blame, in BLAME:  ITS NATURE AND NORMS, supra 
note 1, at 162, 175 and see McKenna, supra note 45, at 119, 127–30, which analogizes blame 
to a conversation, whereby blamer and blamee exchange ideas and make their respective cases. 
 426. See McGeer, supra note 425, at 162, 175. 
 427. See Kelly, supra note 248, at 244, 256 (“In evaluating an agent’s blameworthiness, 
we assess how reasonable it is to expect an agent to act morally in the face of obstacles.”). 
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force interlocutors to consider different perspectives.428  To be sure, the 
respective parties may not be moved by the other’s viewpoint.  What blame 
dynamics can do, however, is bring those competing viewpoints to the same 
table.429 
Third, and perhaps most significantly, blame serves an important quasi-
regulative function.  More specifically, actual or anticipated blame can 
motivate better decisions and behaviors.430  Even if the blamee is unable or 
unwilling to accept responsibility, there can still be public value in blame’s 
signaling effects on how others should conduct themselves in the relevant 
social, political, and legal communities.431 
B.  Blame-Avoidance Tradeoffs 
In large measure, the normativity of blame avoidance is an extension of 
the foregoing ideas.  When blame avoidance is pursued with energy and 
ingenuity, every harm is contested, and every line of responsibility 
tangled.432  But, drawing on key insights from political science, perhaps we 
can view blame-avoidance strategies as containing trade-offs, with 
potentially positive variants that can enhance the quality of governance.433 
Start with presentational strategies.  If blame attribution is a process of 
assigning responsibility for harm,434 then rhetorical tactics to avoid blame 
can upset that social function.435  In many contexts, however, presentational 
strategies might lead us to better information about whether the perceived 
harm is, in fact, a harm.  Moreover, presentational strategies can help direct 
audiences to which individuals or entities are responsible for which harms, 
thus countering misattributions of migrant blame and institutional blame.436  
Relatedly, presentational strategies can be an effective counterweight to 
heuristics and biases that would otherwise go unchallenged in public 
discourse.437  For example, well-framed excuses and justifications can in 
some cases better inform voters and public officials about the complexity of 
 
 428. See id. at 256–57. 
 429. Cf. McGeer, supra note 425, at 180 (arguing that the processes of laying and avoiding 
blame “invariably work to develop the normative understanding of the putative wrongdoer, 
the blamer, or both”). 
 430. See Paul Bloom, Forum Response:  Beyond Blame, BOS. REV. (July 10, 2013), 
http://bostonreview.net/forum/beyond-blame/paul-bloom-blame-motivates-good-behavior 
[https://perma.cc/LSE3-NVBP] (“The thought of being blamed by others, and the associated 
feelings of guilt and shame, can motivate good behavior.”); see also Cheshire Calhoun, 
Responsibility and Reproach, 99 ETHICS 389, 406 (1989) (making the same point). 
 431. See Bell, supra note 423, at 263, 269. 
 432. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 184. 
 433. For an insightful and extended discussion of blame-avoidance trade-offs, from which 
the discussion below draws, see id. at 144–74. 
 434. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text. 
 435. See supra Part III.A. 
 436. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 165. 
 437. See supra Part II.A (discussing how heuristics and biases can lead to systemic 
cognitive errors, and, on a larger scale, can lead to blame cascades). 
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the matters at issue.438  To similar effect, narratives can be met with 
counternarratives, metaphors met with countermetaphors, and so on. 
Agency strategies to avoid blame pose a different set of trade-offs.  On the 
one hand, delegation and complex partnering arrangements can cause 
accountability trails to run cold, so that no one seems responsible when things 
go wrong.439  Moreover, the dispersion of authority can lead to the problem 
of “too many hands,” in which all players plausibly deny blame.440  On the 
other hand, however, agency strategies designed to diffuse blame may have 
positive (even if unintended) consequences.  For instance, congressional 
delegation or the creation of “cooperative federalism” arrangements may 
lodge authority in institutions or officials that are better equipped to make 
and implement policy.441  In addition, public-private partnerships and 
intergovernmental arrangements can pool resources and information in ways 
that enhance what the contributing partners could accomplish on their 
own.442 
Policy strategies designed to produce alibis can lead to laws and protocols 
that are not in the public’s best interest.443  Even well-intended policy 
strategies can inadvertently result in overall welfare loss, as in the 
phenomenon of “iatrogenic risks”—the risks created by ostensibly risk-
reducing policies.444  Notwithstanding these generalized concerns, policy 
strategies for avoiding blame can also have positive results and should be 
valued to that extent.  Under the right conditions, the impulse to avoid blame 
might lead public officials to select better policies and practices.  If “good” 
policies attract less blame than “bad” policies, then officials may be inclined 
toward good policies, whether anticipating or responding to institutional 
blame.  Of course, what qualifies as “good” or “bad” policy is beyond this 
 
 438. See Hood, supra note 3, at 167–68. 
 439. See Bovens et al., supra note 3, at 16 (“When public policies are the product of 
difficult collaborations between many agents, private as well as public, it is more difficult to 
deliver; more difficult to call to account; more difficult even to understand who we should 
hold accountable.”). 
 440. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 174. 
 441. The term “cooperative federalism” generally connotes statutory arrangements in 
which states implement a federally prescribed program or goal. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & 
Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1276 (2009) (arguing 
that states enjoy considerable leverage in the position of uncooperative agent); Philip J. 
Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 
663, 672 (2001). 
 442. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 166. 
 443. See id. at 171. 
 444. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management, 
9 RISK 39, 52 (1998).  Although too soon to say, an example might be President Trump’s travel 
bans.  The Trump administration has touted each travel ban as a security-enhancing measure, 
but some critics worry that the symbolic expressions of the bans will enhance recruitment 
efforts of terrorist organizations and increase the risk of attack. See, e.g., Jessica Kwong, 
Trump’s Travel Ban Helps ISIS Stage Attacks in the U.S., Democrats Say, NEWSWEEK 
(Nov. 17, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/trumps-travel-ban-helps-isis-stage-attacks-us-
democrats-say-715512 [https://permacc/8WZK-N8KL]. 
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Article’s scope.  But, as a general point, it must be appreciated that we often 
blame public officials for “bad” policies so that we can get “good” ones.445 
Nothing I have said is intended to minimize the ever-present dysfunctions 
of blame attribution and blame avoidance.  In the immigration context, as 
elsewhere, blame can lead to irrational, counterproductive, painful, and 
destructive behaviors.  Indeed, these concerns may be especially acute for 
immigration regulation.  As history attests, migrants tend to be easy outlets 
for blame.446  Moreover, for some public officials, it can be politically risky 
not to blame certain categories of migrants.  These phenomena of migrant 
blame and institutional blame are not coincidental:  they go hand in hand and 
can pull in dangerous directions. 
A main thrust of this Article, however, is to offer a partial rehabilitation.  
Appreciating that immigration blame can be functional and dysfunctional 
offers a fresh theoretical starting point.  Future work can direct energy toward 
promoting blame’s constructive possibilities, while reducing its pathologies.  
In the next sections, I offer some preliminary thoughts toward those 
symbiotic objectives. 
C.  Ethics of Immigration Blame 
Immigration blame is cresting all around us, yet we have no principled way 
to answer some fundamental questions.  What distinguishes legitimate from 
illegitimate blame attribution?  What distinguishes legitimate from 
illegitimate blame avoidance?  An “ethics of immigration blame,” proposed 
here, speaks to these and related concerns.447  If followed, these ethical 
precepts could improve the quality of blaming practices in the immigration 
context (and beyond). 
Even without formal legal sanctions, an ethics of immigration blame might 
be realized through voluntary compliance and external pressures from peers, 
principals, and voting constituencies.  Although optimistic, it is not 
unthinkable.  We already do blame public officials and migrants for how they 
attribute and avoid blame.  Thus, the necessary instincts and motivations to 
modulate blaming practices already exist.  An ethics of immigration blame 
 
 445. If that is not our hope when we blame, then why do we blame public officials for 
harmful policies? 
 446. See supra Part I.A. 
 447. The idea for an ethics of immigration blame is inspired by recent work in moral 
philosophy. See generally BLAME:  ITS NATURE AND NORMS, supra note 1 (collecting essays 
on the nature and norms of blame).  But an ethics of immigration blame must pick up where 
moral philosophy leaves off.  The moral philosophy literature is focused on blaming ethics in 
the context of interpersonal relationships (e.g., friendships, families, and in other social 
contexts).  However, government authority and legal structures give rise to different 
accountabilities and institutional roles, for which an ethics of immigration blame must 
account. Cf. David Shoemaker, Blame and Punishment, in BLAME:  ITS NATURE AND NORMS, 
supra note 1, at 100, 100–01 (“[M]oral and legal blame have subtly but importantly different 
structures and functions.”); Smith, supra note 1, at 34 (“[T]he type of blame that it is 
appropriate for any particular individual to direct toward a blameworthy agent may vary 
depending on that individual’s relation to the agent and other specific features of the 
context.”). 
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supplies what is missing—a normative framework of engagement.  By 
delineating a set of general and (I hope) agreeable principles, we will at least 
have something to shoot for. 
Two caveats before proceeding.  First, I make no pretense that better 
blaming practices will lead to better results.  However, by improving the 
dynamics of immigration blame, both the politics and outcomes may be more 
acceptable.  Surely, people will still disagree with the policies that emerge 
from rhetorical wrangling; but the outcomes could be perceived as more 
legitimate if reached through shared norms of engagement. 
Second, to the extent that an ethics of immigration blame calls for pulling 
punches, it may not be in any party’s strategic or ideological interest to 
comply (especially if opponents defect from these principles to their own 
advantage).  Still, for many if not most Americans, there may be a greater 
appetite for fairer play on the fields of immigration blame.  An ethics of 
immigration blame appeals to that demand and begins to chart a way forward. 
1.  Blaming Only Blameworthy Action 
To start, blame should be reserved only for blameworthy action.  
Straightforward as it seems, this basic principle is often honored in the 
breach.  A disquieting motif in immigration scholarship is that migrants 
(especially of color) too often get blamed for nonblameworthy action.448  
Meanwhile, a persistent complaint in public discourse is that 
hyperpartisanship has led to unscrupulous finger-pointing among public 
officials and institutions.449  An ethic that forecloses warrantless blame is 
responsive to these concerns. 
This ethic, however, does not resolve which behaviors are worthy of 
blame.  As earlier explained, that judgment generally turns on perceptions of 
whether the blamee is responsible for an avoidable harm, and if so, whether 
a compelling excuse or justification exists.450  Although a more fully 
developed ethics of immigration blame might specify when these conditions 
are met, I doubt doing so would add much value.  For instance, all should 
agree that it is clearly wrong to blame someone because of their race, and 
 
 448. See supra notes 7, 51–64, 153–56 and accompanying text. 
 449. See Zeke Miller et al., A Weekend of Finger-Pointing as Democrats, GOP Try to 
Dodge Blame for Shutdown, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 21, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ 
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Rivlin, Opinion, Congress:  Take a Timeout from Playing the Political Blame Game, HILL 
(Jan. 29, 2018, 10:00 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/371181-congress-take-a-
timeout-from-playing-the-political-blame-game [https://perma.cc/6R4U-3399] (“A simple 
timeout and a no-blaming pledge could be the first steps to restoring constructive national 
policymaking.”); Press Release, Nat’l League of Cities, Cities Urge Congress to Stop Blame 
Game, Do Its Job (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.nlc.org/article/cities-urge-congress-to-stop-
blame-game-do-its-job [https://perma.cc/N7GP-ZLYT] (“For the sake of every person in 
every city and town in America, Congress and the White House need to stop playing blame 
games with the federal budget.”). 
 450. See supra notes 42–46, 241–48 and accompanying text. 
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generally wrong to blame public officials for matters beyond their 
jurisdiction or institutional role.451  In the former example, being of a certain 
race is not a harm, much less an avoidable one, and is thus not blameworthy.  
In the latter example, the absence of responsibility for some governmental 
harm would negate the public official’s blameworthiness.  In these and 
countless other applications, the evaluative criteria of avoidable harm and 
responsibility do most of the required work.  It thus seems unnecessary to 
delineate each and every iteration of warrantless blame, even if doing so were 
possible. 
Moreover, to my mind, resolving questions of blameworthiness should not 
be the role of an ethics of immigration blame.  Debates about whether blame 
is warranted often turn on normative judgments—for example, whether the 
putative harm is in fact a harm, or whether an excuse is compelling, or 
whether an apology is sincere, or whether a certain institution (and not some 
other) should have decisional authority over an issue.  Shutting down such 
conversations, in the name of an ethics of immigration blame, could 
undermine the dialogic values of blame discussed above.452 
2.  Good-Faith Blaming 
When blame carries sanctions (whether emotional, political, or legal), the 
blamer should follow an ethic of good faith.  At a minimum, this ethic 
eschews the intentional misattribution of blame.453  Beyond that, a good-faith 
ethic could filter out unintentional misattributions of blame by requiring that 
the blamer:  (1) not rush to judgment; (2) afford the blamee the benefit of the 
doubt in close cases; (3) give fair consideration to a blamee’s excuse or 
justification; and, more generally (4) account for the possibility of cognitive 
errors, emotional influences, and epistemic uncertainty.454 
 
 451. It is not necessarily always wrong to blame public officials for matters outside of their 
control.  Blaming might be appropriate, for example, in situations where public officials 
should be deemed accountable simply by virtue of their position in office. See infra note 453. 
 452. See supra Part IV.A. 
 453. Intentional misattribution of blame is almost never justified.  From a utilitarian 
perspective, however, a narrow exception to this general rule arguably applies when the 
overall consequences of misattributed blame advance the public welfare.  For example, 
wrongly blaming a public official (say, an agency head) might protect the political fortunes of 
other public officials (say, the president) who then might retain the necessary credibility to 
pursue other welfare-enhancing policies. See ELLIS, supra note 239, at 1–2, 153, 182–83 
(studying this phenomenon in the presidential context). 
 454. There are similar suggestions in moral philosophy. See Coates & Tognazzini, supra 
note 237, at 22 (“[P]erhaps blame should have a threshold whereby we should not blame if 
reasonable doubt exists over blameworthiness.”); Kelly, supra note 248, at 262 (calling for 
interpretive generosity of the actions of others and the circumstances surrounding them, which 
can “open[] possibilities for understanding, forgiveness, and an honest reckoning with faults 
we might share”).  An ethic of good faith that promotes fairness and factual accuracy links to 
some of my legal prescriptions below. See infra Part V.D.  In particular, administrative 
processes that require transparency, reason giving, and open public participation are—all else 
equal—more likely to generate the type of deliberation and investigation needed to counter 
misattributed blame. See infra notes 488–97 and accompanying text. 
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Some self-awareness, cognitive effort, and interpretive generosity toward 
the actions and intentions of others, can go a long way toward countering 
unwarranted misattributions of blame.  These correctives are all within reach 
because they are generally matters within our control.  Emotional reactions, 
snap judgments, and biases are natural to the way we process information 
about the world around us.  But, as recent studies show, these human 
tendencies might be mediated and improved through self-awareness and 
education.455 
Manufactured blame cascades may lose their potency as more people 
become attuned to what motivates and causes them.  For example, if we are 
aware that confirmation bias may cause us to discount inconvenient 
information, we can expand our cognitive compass to accept new data and 
perspectives.456  If we are aware that negativity bias may cause us to 
subjectively inflate the significance of bad over good, we might push 
ourselves to see matters in a more objective light, smoke out blame 
entrepreneurs who prey on negativity, and seek opportunities to praise 
deserving migrants and public officials.457  Aware that System One 
tendencies can lead to scapegoating, our System Two may lead us to realize 
that scapegoating allows the true source of psychic or social harm to go 
unaddressed.458 
To be sure, all of this is easier said than done.  The point, however, is that 
it can be done with intention. 
3.  Value-Based Blaming 
To complement the foregoing, an ethic of “value-based blaming” would 
require that a token of blame advance one or more of blame’s social values.  
As explained above, those values include registering protest or condemnation 
of wrongful behavior; motivating compliance with social, political, and legal 
norms; and enriching collective thinking about what those norms are or 
should be.459  In contexts where none of those values would be served, a 
token of blame would have no legitimate social function.460  Thus, we might 
 
 455. See, e.g., David DeSteno et al., Beyond Valence in the Perception of Likelihood:  The 
Role of Emotion Specificity, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 397, 412 (2000).  According 
to studies by Dr. DeStano and others, emotional bias can be overcome under the right 
circumstances.  Such circumstances include (1) the realization that emotion might be 
influencing objectivity of the speaker or audience; (2) the motivation to arrive at an objectively 
accurate judgment; and (3) the ability and effort to think more deeply or differently about a 
problem so as to overcome emotion-related effects. Id. 
 456. See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of confirmation 
bias on judgment formation). 
 457. See supra notes 141–44 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of negativity 
bias on judgment formation). 
 458. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text (discussing cognitive dissonance and 
its relationship to scapegoating tendencies); see also DOUGLAS, supra note 37, at 67 (“[T]he 
whole process of scapegoating . . . is not just one of evasion of responsibility but also one of 
obscuring the essential problem.”). 
 459. See supra Part V.A. 
 460. Cf. Bell, supra note 423, at 272 (arguing, in a different context, that “blame is morally 
appropriate when it is fitting and achieves at least one of its multiple aims”). 
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conclude that blame is unnecessary, and probably inappropriate, in such 
situations.461 
4.  Receiving Blame 
Individuals and institutions can respond excellently or poorly when 
targeted with blame.  When blaming others is the blamee’s response, the 
principles outlined above should apply.  Thus, redirected blame should be 
warranted, made in good faith, and serve one or more of blame’s instrumental 
values.462 
Further, a blamee should at least consider a blamer’s allegations and, 
ideally, reflect seriously on the charge.463  To be clear, the blamee need not 
accept the criticism or complaint.  But blamees who reflexively deny blame 
can miss something important about their own behavior and forfeit the 
opportunity for remediation or improvement. 
*          *          * 
If followed, the foregoing principles would set a new benchmark for how 
blame is practiced and experienced.  Almost everything we know about 
people outside of our social and professional circles is shaped by others (e.g., 
politicians, pundits, colleagues, the media) who have incentives to provide 
whatever information will elicit the intended reaction (e.g., outrage, 
sympathy, sorrow).464  Escaping those influences is not easy, owing to 
informational asymmetries, cognitive biases, and reputational concerns.  But 
we generally can control how we react to others’ attempts to dole out and 
avoid blame.465  Moreover, how we personally dole out blame, avoid blame, 
and assist others in these regards are certainly within reach. 
D.  Legalistic Nudges 
To complement an ethics of immigration blame, the law might be 
leveraged to neutralize some of blame’s downsides.  There are important 
limitations, however, to any legalistic approach.  Most notably, such 
prescriptions must account for existing legal structures that, in all probability, 
cannot be reengineered for blame’s sake.  The First Amendment’s Free 
 
 461. To be sure, judgments about whether a particular token of blame serves a valuable 
function will often be contested.  Most notably, a blamer may see value in blaming where 
others do not.  There is no easy way around this puzzle.  One way to address it, however, is 
through a rebuttable presumption:  a token of blame might be deemed presumptively proper 
when, from an objective standpoint, one or more of blame’s values are reasonably advanced. 
 462. See supra notes 449–60 and accompanying text (calling for these ethical norms). 
 463. See Bell, supra note 423, at 279–80. 
 464. See supra Part II; cf. Barbara Fried, Forum:  Beyond Blame, BOS. REV. (June 28, 
2013), http://bostonreview.net/forum/barbara-fried-beyond-blame-moral-responsibility-
philosophy-law [https://perma.cc/3U5M-DZSG] (making a similar point and eschewing 
blame on metaphysical grounds). 
 465. Cf. Shaun Nichols, After Incompatibilism:  A Naturalistic Defense of the Reactive 
Attitudes, 21 PHIL. PERSP. 405, 412 (2007) (distinguishing between narrow-profile emotional 
responses, which are local or immediate emotional reactions to situations, and wide-profile 
responses, which are not immediate and can involve rational reflection). 
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Speech Clause is an important example.466  Narratives, metaphors, excuses, 
justifications, and so on, may be preposterous, misleading, and offensive.  
Still, they generally will be constitutionally protected forms of speech and 
thus beyond regulatory controls.467  Therefore, any attempt to directly 
regulate blaming statements and presentational blame-avoiding tactics will 
generally be unavailing. 
A more promising approach would focus on agency and policy strategies 
for avoiding blame.468  Because these blame-avoidance strategies are 
undertaken by government officials through the medium of law, they may 
also be more conducive to legalistic nudges.  For example, agency strategies 
to avoid blame through delegation and governmental partnerships generally 
depend on legal warrants to do so.  Likewise, policy strategies to avoid blame 
often take the form of hard or soft law.469  These and related blame-avoidance 
tactics, which generally depend on the law for their implementation, are 
potentially ripe for regulatory controls in ways that presentational tactics are 
not. 
1.  Agency Strategies 
Agency strategies that tangle lines of accountability may engender 
unproductive, and potentially disruptive, immigration blame games.  To 
counter those effects, lines of accountability might be simplified through 
legal doctrine and statutory design.  To be clear, the suggestion here is not 
that delegations and governmental partnering be forbidden:  those design 
choices pervade our legal system, often with good intentions and effect. 
Rather, the suggestion is that when those design choices are made, the 
resulting lines of accountability can facilitate or fluster ascriptions of 
institutional blame. 
All else equal, institutional blame will be more productive when lines of 
governmental accountability are clear and stable, rather than opaque and 
shifty.  First, clear lines of accountability are needed for the polity to know 
which public officials are responsible for which public harms.  In turn, public 
officials—knowing they will be on the hook for perceived harms—may be 
more inclined to act responsibly, ex ante, to avoid being blamed ex post.  
Second, stable lines of responsibility will also generally enhance the efficacy 
of institutional blame.  When the lines of accountability are unstable, or 
flimsy, public officials can too easily escape attributions of institutional 
blame. 
 
 466. U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting free speech and ideas). 
 467. Cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (“[S]peech cannot be restricted simply 
because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”). 
 468. See supra Part III.B–C (discussing these blame-avoidance strategies by public 
officials). 
 469. By soft law, I mean to refer to government policies that are not formally binding but 
that nevertheless control or influence how government authority is exercised.  For example, 
DACA and DAPA would fall into the category of soft law because they were formed outside 
of notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, and they ostensibly do not create rights or 
duties. See DAPA Memo, supra note 225; DACA Memo, supra note 225. 
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As discussed further below, clear and stable lines of accountability are not 
a panacea, as those conditions may simply lead public officials to other, 
potentially more acute, forms of blame avoidance.470  But if tighter 
accountability is worth pursuing to close at least some blame-avoidance 
spigots, then the Supreme Court’s exceptional immigration doctrines are 
prime candidates for reconsideration. 
Start with the plenary power doctrine.  The Court has yet to clearly 
delineate the scope of the Executive’s immigration powers vis-à-vis 
Congress.471  In contrast to the type of clear and stable delegations idealized 
above, the lawmaking relationship between Congress and the Executive in 
the immigration context is rather opaque.472  It is characterized more by 
“de facto delegation” than formal delegations.473  That leaves important 
questions unanswered about which federal institutions are responsible, and 
thus which to blame, for the egregious mismatch between Congress’s “laws 
on the books” and the “law in action.”474 
To this concern, Article II’s Take Care Clause offers some residual 
promise.475  To wit, the Court might interpret this provision to create 
substantive limits on the Executive’s discretionary authority.  The metes and 
bounds of what that doctrine should be, or could be, has been debated at 
 
 470. There are two reasons for this.  First, greater accountability can lead public officials 
toward other forms of blame avoidance (such as presentational or policy strategies) which may 
be even harder to control.  Second, and relatedly, too much accountability, or the wrong type 
of it, can stultify creative and efficient governance. See Christopher Hood, Accountability and 
Transparency:  Siamese Twins, Matching Parts, Awkward Couple?, 33 W. EUR. POL. 989, 992 
(2010) (“[F]ormal transparency requirements tend to lead to low-intelligence defensive box-
ticking and one-way communication rather than real answerability in effective dialogue.”). 
 471. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law 
Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 133–34 (2015); Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 19, at 609–
12 (discussing this gap in the Court’s immigration jurisprudence). 
 472. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 
YALE L.J. 458, 476–78, 485 (2009). 
 473. Id. at 485 (explaining that “the intricate rule-like provisions of the immigration code, 
which on their face appear to limit executive discretion, actually have had the effect of 
delegating tremendous authority to the President to set the screening rules for immigrants—
that is, to decide on the composition of the immigrant community”); see also MOTOMURA, 
supra note 51, at 21–22, 53. 
 474. See Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 116 
(2013) (“The law on the books is different from the law in action, and enforcement is a vital 
part of law’s identity as law.”); see also MOTOMURA, supra note 51, at 50–55 (explaining how 
the gap between Congress’s immigration laws—law on the books—and executive 
enforcement—law in action—creates the conditions for arbitrary and racialized enforcement 
practices). 
 475. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  Incidentally, the Article I nondelegation doctrine is almost 
certainly not the answer, given how liberally the Court applies the doctrine. See Thomas W. 
Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1:  From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2099 (2004) (noting the “difficulty of squaring” the postulate that 
“Congress may not delegate legislative power[] with the fact that Congress has massively 
delegated legislative rulemaking authority to administrative agencies”). 
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length in the literature476 and, in the DAPA litigation, was left undecided by 
the Supreme Court.477 
A blame lens offers new perspective.  Interpreting the Take Care Clause 
in accountability-enhancing ways can promote more accurate ascriptions of 
institutional blame.  In turn, more efficacious blaming may lead to more 
responsible laws “on the books” (by Congress) and “in action” (by the 
Executive).  Again, the emphasis on may here is important:  limiting agency 
strategies can simply lead to other forms of institutional blame avoidance—
namely, presentational and policy strategies.  Thus, shoring up lines of 
accountability may be a start, but it no way guarantees better results. 
To see how, return to the amnesty example.  Over this subject, the lines of 
institutional accountability are reasonably clear and stable:  only Congress 
can decide whether to legalize undocumented migrants.  As reflected in 
today’s amnesty debates, however, that accountability does not necessarily 
portend rational or desirable policies.  Fully accountable legislators might 
manage their risk of institutional blame through policy strategies that are 
responsive (or overresponsive) to the perceptions (or misperceptions) of their 
key constituents.478  In this and other examples, it is blame-avoidance policy 
strategies—not agency strategies—that may pose the greater challenge. 
2.  Policy Strategies 
When immigration policies are crafted to avoid blame, they may not be 
economically, pragmatically, or normatively rational.  Again, adjustments to 
the Court’s plenary power doctrine might indirectly help, but this time in a 
different way.  Rather than (or in addition to) shoring up lines of 
accountability, the plenary power doctrine might be adjusted to limit the 
range of blame-avoiding policies available to the federal political branches. 
As currently applied, the Court’s plenary power doctrine relaxes 
constitutional limits on federal immigration laws.479  In turn, this affords 
Congress and the Executive more maneuverability to design policies with an 
eye toward avoiding blame.  If the Court brings the plenary power doctrine 
 
 476. For contrasting views on what the Take Care Clause entails, or should entail, in 
regards to executive enforcement discretion, compare Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 471, at 
174–77, which eschews hard constitutional limits on the president’s enforcement authority, 
with Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On:  The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. 
L. REV. 781, 784–85 (2013), and Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive 
Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 759–60 (2014), both of which argue that the Take Care Clause 
limits the president’s enforcement discretion. 
 477. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam) (affirming, without 
opinion, the Fifth Circuit’s preliminary injunction of DAPA in Texas v. United States, 805 
F.3d 653, 657 (5th Cir. 2015)). 
 478. See supra Part IV.C.1. 
 479. See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text. 
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in line with mainstream constitutional norms, some of the most concerning 
federal immigration policies might be taken off the table.480 
I have already discussed how that is arguably the case for President 
Trump’s travel bans.481  If not for the Court’s overweening deference to 
Congress and the Executive, the enabling statute and the travel bans might 
never have been crafted, much less survived judicial review in Trump v. 
Hawaii. 
Consider also Jennings v. Rodriguez,482 which the Supreme Court recently 
remanded to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.483  At issue in 
Jennings is the constitutionality of statutes that require the detention of 
certain categories of migrants, without the opportunity for bond, even if the 
migrants pose no flight risk or danger to the community.484  This detention 
scheme is unmatched anywhere else in domestic U.S. law.485  Were the Court 
to apply its mainstream due process principles, rather than the highly 
deferential plenary power doctrine, this detention scheme would most likely 
be unconstitutional.486  Indeed, but for the enabling plenary power doctrine, 
the statutory scheme may never have been created in the first place. 
The same ideas hold when moving from constitutional rights to 
constitutional structure.  Ongoing litigation over the sanctuary city 
movement involves unsettled questions about formal immigration 
responsibility between Congress and the Executive, on the one hand, and 
between federal and subfederal officials on the other.487  Depending on how 
those structural issues are resolved, certain policy options—both federal and 
local—may be taken off the table. 
Again, I cannot say with certainty that any of the policies in the foregoing 
examples were undertaken to avoid institutional blame.  Nor do I mean to 
take a position here on the legal or normative merits of the policies under 
review.  Rather, these examples are offered to illustrate a generalizable 
 
 480. Cf. Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 19, at 630–38 (explaining how and why 
adjustments to the plenary power doctrine would not lead to predictable or easily controlled 
policy outcomes). 
 481. See supra notes 95–105, 405–07 and accompanying text. 
 482. 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
 483. Id. at 836 (holding that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) do not give detained 
aliens the right to periodic bond hearings during the course of their detention, and that the 
Ninth Circuit misapplied the canon of constitutional avoidance in holding otherwise). 
 484. See id. 
 485. See Kevin Johnson, Argument Analysis:  Justices Seem Primed to Find Constitutional 
Limits on the Detention of Immigrants, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 4, 2017), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/10/argument-analysis-justices-seem-primed-find-
constitutional-limits-detention-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/M2UW-BU7H].  Ahilan 
Arulanantham of the ACLU, arguing the case for the immigrants, said “this Court has never 
authorized detention without a hearing before a neutral decision-maker, outside of national 
security, beyond six months.” Id. 
 486. See Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 19, at 596; see also Rubenstein, supra 
note 91. 
 487. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–3, 12, City & County of San 
Francisco v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017) (arguing that the 
Trump administration’s attempt to deny San Francisco certain federal funding because of the 
city’s policies violated principles of both federalism and separation of powers). 
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dynamic:  namely, how adjustments to the Court’s doctrines could have 
downstream effects on the policy choices available to officials across all 
levels of government.  The policy options taken off the table would include 
blame-avoiding policies. 
Apart from the Court’s exceptional immigration doctrines, administrative 
law offers additional legalistic levers.  Courts can hardly be expected to 
identify and invalidate regulatory policies merely for being products of 
immigration blame.  Under the Court’s “hard look” doctrine, however, 
regulators are required to demonstrate that their policies are rationally 
conceived and take due regard for available facts and alternative approaches 
to regulatory problems.488  Depending on how rigorously courts apply this 
standard, ill-advised policy strategies for avoiding institutional blame may 
be indirectly tempered.489 
Along similar lines, irrational agency decisions might be countered by 
administrative processes that require transparency and offer a wider set of 
public viewpoints.  Toward that end, administrative law doctrines (which are 
notoriously fuzzy with respect to certain procedural exemptions),490 could be 
clarified and tweaked to channel more administrative decisions toward 
notice-and-comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).491 
For notice-and-comment rulemaking, the APA requires the agency to 
provide advance notice of its proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register 
and offer interested parties the opportunity to submit written comments in 
response.492  Moreover, to enable meaningful public comments, courts have 
required the agency to make its intentions clearly known in the notice of 
rulemaking.493  Finally, although the APA textually requires that a final 
regulation be accompanied by “a concise general statement of [the 
regulation’s] basis and purpose,”494 courts generally require the agency to 
respond to all significant comments received and to explain its decisions 
rather thoroughly.495 
 
 488. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (“No regulation is 
‘appropriate’ if it does significantly more harm than good.” (emphasis added)); Judulang v. 
Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 64 (2011) (“We must reverse an agency policy when we cannot discern 
a reason for it.”); see also Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983) (establishing that courts must take a hard look at agencies’ reasons for 
action and inaction). 
 489. See supra note 355 and accompanying text. 
 490. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, 
and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 
1312 n.2 (1992); John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 894–
96 (2004). 
 491. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012). 
 492. Id. § 553(b). 
 493. See, e.g., NRDC v. EPA, 279 F.3d 1180, 1187–88 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 494. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
 495. See, e.g., Reytblatt v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 105 F.3d 715, 722 (D.C. Cir. 
1997); see also Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (requiring 
an agency to respond to “comments which, if true . . . would require a change in [the] agency’s 
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To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that considerations of blame 
dynamics should necessarily tip the scales in long-running debates on 
administrative law’s optimal design.  My more modest point is that generally 
accepted tropes of “good” governance—such as accountability, 
transparency, deliberation, and expertise—can also create obstacles to “bad” 
forms of policy blame avoidance. 
CONCLUSION 
More than just relevant, blame has transfiguring effects on the immigration 
system’s operation and design.  Although we might conceive of a society 
without immigration blame, it is not ours.  Nor should we want one.  The 
nature and norms of immigration blame are things to improve, not stamp out 
wholesale. 
There are any number of directions that future work might take.  First, the 
theoretical model offered here could benefit from empirical testing.  For 
example, polling numbers and experiments might be used to test correlations 
between migrant blame and institutional blame.  Anecdotally, there seem to 
be strong correlations in the contexts studied here.  Empirical testing might 
offer important refinements and extensions. 
Second, this Article’s study of immigration blame can be complemented 
by an orthogonal study of “immigration praise.”  I have focused here on 
blame, rather than praise, because blame seems more potent and salient to 
current conditions.  Moreover, as earlier explained, negativity bias helps to 
explain why blame generally dominates over praise as a social, political, and 
legal catalyst.496  That said, praise undoubtedly has a place in the immigration 
system.  One can easily identify instances of migrant praise, institutional 
praise, praise attribution, and praise seeking.  How these praise dynamics 
interact with each other, and with their foils in immigration blame, are 
subjects that warrant further study.497 
Third, this Article’s normative and prescriptive treatments of immigration 
blame are hardly meant to be the last word.  I have outlined what an ethics of 
immigration blame should entail.  Further, I have offered some preliminary 
thoughts on how legal doctrines and structures might be leveraged to promote 
the values of blame, while countering some of its more unsavory effects.  
Space did not allow for more, but surely more might be said.  This Article 
 
proposed rule” (first alteration in original) (quoting ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1581 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987))). 
 496. Cf. Baumeister et al., supra note 139, at 354–55 (describing how bad dominates good 
across multiple cognitive and social settings); Weaver, supra note 13, at 374 (explaining that, 
owing to negativity bias, voters are more likely to mobilize out of protest than out of 
satisfaction); see also GARY WATSON, AGENCY AND ANSWERABILITY 283 (2004) (arguing that 
praise is not the mirror image of blame, in part because the negative force of blame generally 
prompts more intense and consequential reactions than praise); supra notes 320–21 and 
accompanying text (discussing how negativity bias may be factoring into debates over 
comprehensive immigration reform). 
 497. I am currently exploring these subjects, in a piece tentatively titled “Immigration 
Praise.” 
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has provided the vocabulary and vision.  But what immigration blame ought 
to be is a shared responsibility.  Future generations will rightly blame us if 
we do not try for better. 
